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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis is a study on the European Union’s evolving Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP). It aims to analyze the evolution of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy of the European Union from its Cold War origins with particular 
consideration on post-Cold War developments. Emphasis will be put on the 
divergences of ideas resulting from the internal dynamics of the Union that shape the 
security policies of the EU. In this study, the major question, which will be tried to 
be answered, is how have the divisions within the EU, which result from the internal 
dynamics of the EU, affected the evolution of the Union’s security policies. This 
study argues that the divisions within the European Union have so far prevented the 
Union from pursuing an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy. Cooperation 
with NATO in the field of crisis management would provide the EU with military 
assets and capabilities which are required for an effective military crisis management 
mission. At the same time, this study argues that an effective crisis management in 
the EU can be achieved by covering both military and civilian aspects of crisis 
management in a balanced way. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
Bu tez, Avrupa Birliğinin (AB) gelişen Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası 
üzerine yapılmış bir çalışmadır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası gelişmeler üzerinde 
yoğunlaşılarak, Avrupa Birliğinin Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikasının Soğuk 
Savaştaki kökenleriyle birlikte gelişiminin analiz edilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Avrupa 
Birliğinin iç dinamiklerinden kaynaklanarak Birliğin güvenlik politikalarının 
şekillendiren fikir ayrılıkları üzerinde durulmuştur. Bu çalışmada, AB içi 
dinamiklerden kaynaklanan fikir ayrılıklarının AB’nin güvenlik politikalarının 
gelişimini nasıl etkilediği araştırılmıştır. Bu çalışmanın temel savı, AB içi 
bölünmelerin Avrupa Birliğinin etkin bir Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası izlemesini 
engellemekte olduğudur. Kriz yönetimi alanında NATO ile işbirliğine gidilmesi, 
Avrupa Birliğine etkin bir askeri kriz yönetim görevi için gerekli olan askeri 
kabiliyetleri sağlayacaktır. Aynı zamanda bu çalışma, AB içerisindeki etkin bir kriz 
yönetim gücünün kriz yönetiminin askeri ve sivil yönlerini dengeli bir şekilde 
kapsayarak başarılı olabileceğini ileri sürmektedir.       
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Introduction 
 
 
The Treaty of Paris of 1951 was the first step towards European integration. 
The Treaty established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which 
created a common market for coal, steel, coke, iron ore and scrap between France, 
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and Italy. The motivation behind 
the establishment of the ECSC was to put coal and steel production in France and 
Germany under a joint authority and control Germany that was perceived to have 
caused two world wars in the first half of the 20th century. Steel production was 
needed for the construction of railways, buildings, ships, vehicles and machinery that 
had been destroyed by the bombings during the war. The cooperation in the area of 
steel production furthered the integration process within Europe. The European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) was established with the Treaty of Rome, which was signed on 25 March 
1957. EEC aimed to provide economic development and thus political stability in 
Europe. In 1968, the Customs Union was completed and common external tariff was 
established. Other countries, observing the economic growth and other benefits of the 
Community, considered applying for membership. Thus, in 1961, Ireland, the UK, 
Denmark, and Norway applied for membership. The first wave of EC enlargement 
took place in 1973. Ireland, the UK, Denmark eventually joined the Community after 
a four-year negotiation process. In 1978, Bremen European Council approved a plan 
to set up European Monetary System (EMS) and European monetary unit (ECU). It 
was also decided that EMS would take effect retrospectively from 1 January 1979. 
The following significant developments towards European integration were 
European Political Cooperation and the Single Act of 1986.  
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In 1970, European Political Cooperation (EPC) was introduced to provide a 
network for communication and cooperation between governments in the area of 
foreign policy matters. EPC constituted an intergovernmental forum for policy 
consultation and the exchange of information between EC member states. The failure 
of EPC members to coordinate an effective response to the OPEC oil price rises in 
1973 caused EPC to exist as an ineffective institution throughout the 1970s. With 
their economies in chaos, member states reacted individually rather than jointly to 
face common problems. However, EPC was concerned about the political and 
economic aspects of security, and it ignored the military aspects of security. 
European Political Cooperation was replaced by the Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) which established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of 
the European Union in 1993. 
The Single Act signed in 1986 created a space without any internal borders 
and aimed to provide the free circulation of goods, services, capital, and persons. It 
had three important objectives:1 first, creating a large internal market by 1 January 
1993; second, increasing the role of the European parliament; third, improving the 
decision-making capacity of the Council of Ministers. The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 
was built on the provisions of the Single Act and strengthened its objectives and 
mechanisms. The Treaty focused on a plan for achieving full monetary union among 
the Union states by 1999. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty introduced a three-pillar 
structure: the European Community, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and 
cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs. The launching of a Common 
                                                 
1 David Weigall and Peter Stirk, The Origins & Development of the European Community. London: 
Leicester University Press, 1992), 201. 
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Foreign and Security Policy at Maastricht indicated the collective aspiration of the 
EU to play a unified foreign and security policy approach in world politics.2        
Although the integration process of Western Europe developed successfully 
after World War II, the evolution of security policies in Western Europe was 
problematic. Western European Union (WEU) was established by Britain, France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg in 1948 in Europe. The WEU member 
states aimed that the WEU would provide a safeguard against a renewal of German 
militarism and Soviet aggression. Later, the fear of a revival of German militarism 
led France to propose the Pleven Plan of 1950, which required the establishment of a 
European Defense Community, with a European Army that included German troops. 
The EDC was to consist of 100,000 troops, and half of this force would be French 
with the West German contingent controlled by French military authorities. 
However, the Pleven Plan did not turn into a reality by the ratification failure in the 
France Parliament caused by political factors.  
The EDC and WEU failed to provide a security and defense cooperation in 
Western Europe during the Cold War. The main reason behind these failures was the 
divergences of security policies between the leading states of Europe, especially 
between France, West Germany, and Britain. For this reason, the security of Western 
Europe was guaranteed by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) during the 
Cold War.  
The fall of Berlin Wall in November 1989, the German reunification, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the wars in Caucasus and especially the wars in 
Yugoslavia provided new impetus to the process of European defense. The wars in 
Yugoslavia showed the weaknesses of the Europeans and their deficiencies in the 
                                                 
2 Brian White, Understanding European Foreign Policy (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), 20.  
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areas of command and communications, intelligence gathering, precision-guided 
munitions, cruise missiles, heavy airlift capacity and in-flight refueling. In particular, 
the experiences of the Kosovo conflict acted as a catalyst for European security. At 
the Helsinki Summit of 1999, European leaders decided to develop a new Common 
European Security and Defense Policy aimed at giving the EU a stronger role in 
international affairs backed up by credible forces.  
After the Cold War period, NATO and EU relations also gained a new 
impetus in the area of security cooperation against newly emerging security threats in 
the post-Cold War era posed by proliferation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
terrorism and ethnic conflicts. In 1996, NATO began to develop a European Security 
and Defense Identity to provide a more balanced partnership between North America 
and Europe. NATO decided to make its assets available for WEU operations and 
adapted the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept for WEU-led operations. 
After the Helsinki Summit of 1999 at which the EU decided to absorb the WEU in 
the near future, and to create a Rapid Reaction Force of 50,000-60,000 troops by 
2003 for Petersberg missions, at the North Atlantic Council meetings in 1999, NATO 
declared that it would provide ready EU access to NATO collective assets and 
capabilities, but on a case-by-case basis and consensus.  
There are various problems hindering the development of the CJTF concept. 
First, EU member states, in particular France, have some doubts about the 
development European Security and Defense Identity within NATO. France is 
concerned about NATO’s ‘right of first refusal’. Even though NATO will give its 
assets and capabilities to the European members of the Alliance or the EU to conduct 
independent military operations, the US will retain an effective veto over CJTF 
operations, since it will insist on giving its approval before giving its assets. Thus, 
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the success of the CJTF structure will depend on the US authorization to give its 
assets and capabilities to the European command. If the US refuses to authorize the 
use of its assets, the CJTF will become redundant.3 Second, France and the United 
States could not agree on a mechanism for political control over a CJTF. Third, many 
lower level officers who would have to implement the CJTF might be less 
enthusiastic.4  
At the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the EU represented an aspiration to 
combine all civilian and military instruments in order to be able to respond to a 
variety of small and large crises. Military capabilities could provide a secure 
environment, but the military could not build a society, with its infrastructure, basic 
services, and administration. Hence, the European Council of Santa Maria Da Feira 
of 19 and 20 June 2000 took important decisions for the development of civilian 
crisis management capabilities. 
This dissertation analyzes the evolution of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy of the European Union. The objective of this study is an analysis of 
the evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European 
Union with particular emphasis on post-Cold War developments. The emphasis will 
be on the divergences of ideas resulting from the internal dynamics of the Union that 
shape the security policies of the EU. The major question, which I will seek to the 
answer in this study, is how the divisions in the EU resulting from its internal 
dynamics have affected the evolution of the Union’s security policies.  
The aim of choosing this subject rests upon two concerns. The first concern 
is to provide a good understanding of security policies of the European Union and its 
members. Under the CFSP pillar, the EU aimed to develop civil and military 
                                                 
3 Nora Bensahel, “Separable But Not Separate Forces: NATO’s Development of the Combined Joint 
Task Force,” European Security 8, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 65. 
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resources and capabilities to take and implement decisions for conflict prevention 
and crisis management missions. On the other hand, some individual declarations 
from France and Germany show that there is a desire on the part of the EU to become 
a global superpower. But the Nordic states object to the notion of a European army. 
Finland and Sweden have chosen militarily non-alignment as an instrument in 
achieving security policy stability in northern Europe. Moreover, these states prefer 
to use the term of ‘crisis management’ instead of ‘defense’ in the EU context. For 
example, at the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Finland and Sweden wanted to see an 
explicit statement that the goal would not be the establishment of a European army. 
Thus, Helsinki Presidency Conclusions stated that ‘the process will avoid 
unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.’ In 
brief, this study aims to explore the divergences of ideas between the member states 
of the EU regarding the development of an autonomous crisis management 
capability. 
The second concern for choosing this subject is that developments in the 
European Security and Defense Policy would have implications for Turkey. Turkey 
was accepted as candidate to the Union at Helsinki Summit of 1999. If Turkey joins 
the Union, it will be a part of European security architecture. Moreover, Turkey has 
much to contribute to the European crisis management capability with its developed 
army aviation and air forces. On the other hand, if Turkey is not accepted to join the 
Union or its membership is delayed, there are likely to be reverse security 
implications for Turkey. The EU has requested the authorization to have ready access 
to the military assets of NATO. NATO Charter requires unanimity of its members 
for such a kind of authorization. Turkey, as a non-member of the Union has rejected 
                                                                                                                                          
4 Ibid. 
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to give its unconditional approval to such a request that would mean losing its 
control over the use of NATO assets in the possible operations of the EU.5 This is 
because Turkey believes that EU-led operations may contradict its national interests. 
There are six conflict scenarios drawn up by NATO contingency planners that 
require the direct involvement of Turkey. EU military operation in the vicinity of 
Turkey without Turkey’s participation in planning and operation phase may threaten 
its security. This is why, it is significant to have a good understanding of the 
dynamics of the EU’s evolving security and defense policy.       
Chapter 1 mainly deals with the evolution of the European Union. For the 
understanding of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, it is essential 
to explore the motives behind European integration. Thus, this chapter attempts to 
present the circumstances, which lead to European integration just after the World 
War II. It will also analyze the cornerstone developments in the process of European 
integration such as the establishment of European Economic Community, the Single 
Act of 1986, and the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 in detail. In the second part of this 
chapter, the Treaty on the European Union and the three-pillar structure of the EU 
will be discussed. The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 modified the European Community 
into a European Union consisting of three pillars: the European Community, the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, and cooperation in the field of justice and 
home affairs. The Community agreed at Maastricht that there should be CFSP in 
order to protect the fundamental interests of the Community and reinforce its world 
role. The main reason behind the implementation of the pillar structure was to add 
powers to the Union in the areas of foreign policy, security and defense policy, 
asylum and immigration policy, criminal and judicial co-operation.       
                                                 
5 Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “Turkey’s Triple-Trouble: ESDP, Cyprus and Northern Iraq,” Insight Turkey 4, 
no. 1 (January- March 2002): 51.  
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Chapter 2 focuses specifically on the evolution of security policies in Western 
Europe after the World War II. In the first part of this chapter, the reasons behind the 
failures of security cooperation in Western Europe during the Cold War are 
presented. Moreover, the divergences of security policies between Western European 
states during the Cold War are also discussed. In the second part of this chapter, post-
Cold War security policies in Western Europe are analyzed.            
Chapter 3 deals with the dynamics of the European Security and Defense 
Policy in the post-Cold War era. In this chapter, NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force 
concept and Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) will be analyzed. The problematic 
issues related with the development of the CJTF concept will also be discussed. The 
outcomes of the Helsinki Summit of 1999, and the factors that would hinder the 
development of European Security and Defense Policy will be analyzed. 
One of the divisions in the European Union is about development of non-
military crisis management capability. Nordic EU member states, in particular 
Sweden and Finland, has been seen to guard against the dominance of military means 
within EU crisis management initiative.6 With the initiative of Finland and Sweden, 
the Helsinki Summit of 1999 approved a report on non-military crisis management. 
This report stated that the EU decided to establish a non-military crisis management 
mechanism to coordinate and make more effective the civilian means and resources, 
in parallel with the military ones. Hence, Chapter 4 will deal with the development of 
the civilian aspects of crisis management in the European Union. If the EU succeeds 
in developing an effective non-military crisis management capability, this situation 
would have implications for Turkey. Turkey wants to contribute to the development 
                                                 
6 Hanna Ojanen, “Participation and Influence: Finland, Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam 
Development of the CFSP,” Occasional Papers (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, 
January 2000), available from http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ11.html; accessed 8 July 
2002. 
 9 
of the ESDP. However, Turkey makes its plans as if the EU will create a military 
force. Turkey offered in February 2000 to provide a brigade-size unit supported by 
air and naval components. On the other hand, Turkey does not have any contribution 
plan for the development of non-military crisis management in the EU. Besides, 
Turkish officials are far from understanding the internal dynamics of the European 
Union. The difference of this study from some other studies about the European 
security is that this thesis attempts to explore the internal dynamics of the EU.  
The key success of the EU in non-military crisis management has so far 
been the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. For this reason, in the second part of 
Chapter 4, the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe will be analyzed. The 
organizational structure, achievements, and failures of the Stability Pact will also be 
discussed.  
Conclusion chapter will summarize the findings of the previous chapters. It 
will be argued that the divisions within the European Union have so far prevented the 
Union from pursuing an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy. Besides, 
this chapter will reflect upon the implications of the ESDP for Turkey.    
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CHAPTER 1 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION   
 
This chapter focuses on the evolution of the European Union. It aims to 
explore the motives behind European integration. It also attempts to focus on the 
circumstances, which lead to European integration after the World War II. It will 
analyze the cornerstone developments in the process of European integration such as 
the establishment of European Economic Community, the Single Act of 1986, and 
the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 in detail. The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 modified the 
European Community into a European Union consisting of three pillars. In the 
second part of this chapter, the three-pillar structure provided by the Maastricht 
Treaty is analyzed.          
1.1 The Evolution of the European Union    
The European integration started with the establishment of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950. Based on a plan, which is called the 
Schuman Plan, the ECSC was established to put coal and steel production in France 
and Germany under a joint authority. The ECSC would also deepen the integration 
process within Europe.1 In 1957, the European Economic Community was 
established by the six Western European states to enhance the economic 
development and political stability in Europe. The Treaty of Rome of 1957 also 
launched the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to provide a fair standard of living 
for the agricultural community by increasing their individual earnings, and to 
stabilize markets. Another important development in the European integration was 
the European Monetary Union (EMU). A timetable was planned to launch EMU in 
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the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. EMU would provide a single Community currency, 
Community control of national monetary policies and massive transfers of funds to 
the community budget.2  
1.1.1 The Schuman Plan and the European Coal and Steel Community of 
1950 
At the end of the Second World War, the Western European states found 
themselves caught up in a radically new situation in Europe. The continent was 
divided into two blocks, which are dominated by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 
Leading Western European states, France and Britain, and the US took part in 
establishing the Atlantic Alliance. Germany was divided and the United States was 
determined to consolidate and rearm the western half of the Europe.3 At the end of 
the 1940s, the integration in Western Europe provided for France a necessity and a 
choice: it was a question of defining a new relationship with Germany. The European 
leaders held a major conference in Geneva in July 1944. In the conference, a united 
Europe that would prevent the outbreak of war in future was discussed.4 Besides, it 
was argued at the conference that a united Europe should have a government directly 
responsible to the people of the member states, a written constitution, an army, and a 
supreme court.5 
After the Second World War, the major reason behind the European 
integration was to prevent the Western European countries from going to war against 
                                                                                                                                          
1 Hans Mouritzen, “Security Communities in the Baltic Sea Region,” Security Dialogue 32, no. 3 
(2001): 303. 
2 Anne Daltrop, Politics and the European Community (Hong Kong: Longman, 1982), 20. 
3 Philippe Moreau Defarges, “France and Europe,” in Policy Making in France from de Gaulle to 
Mitterrand, ed. Paul Godt (London: Pinter Publishers), 226.   
4 Daltrop, Politics and the European Community, 3. 
5 Derek W. Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945 (New 
York: Longman Inc., 1991), 49. 
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each other.6 At the same time, the economic situation of Europe required immediate 
action, since there were nine million refugees, and towns, roads and railways had 
been destroyed by the bombings during the war.7 Capital investment in industry had 
been neglected except for military purposes. The iron, steel, coal, chemicals, bricks 
and cement were needed in short supply for the reconstruction of railways, buildings, 
ships, vehicles, and machinery,8 and the worst of all, the European industry was 
unable to produce the goods for export needed to pay for the imported goods from 
the US.9 
The Monnet Plan developed by Jean Monnet, the French economist and 
administrator, intended to make the French economy competitive and to reverse the 
technological inferiority of the French economy.10 The Monnet Plan aimed to get an 
access to Ruhr’s resources of coal and coke and to replace German goods in both 
Germany and her export markets with French goods.11 Jean Monnet, one of the 
founders of the EU, emphasized that the need for the European integration was 
economic and political: 
The need was political as well as economic. The Europeans had to 
overcome the mistrust born of centuries of feuds and wars. The 
governments and peoples of Europe still thought in the old terms of 
victors and vanquished. Yet, if a basis for peace in the world was to 
be established, these notions had to be eliminated. Here again, one 
had to go beyond the nation and the conception of national interest as 
an end itself. We thought that both objectives could in time be 
reached if conditions were crated enabling these countries to increase 
their resources by merging them in a large and dynamic common 
market; and if these same countries could be made to consider that 
their problems were no longer solely of national concern, but were 
mutual European responsibilities…. People, more often outside the 
European Community than within, are tempted to see the European 
                                                 
6 Michael Calingaert, European Integration Revisited: Progress, Prospects and U.S. Interests 
(Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 1. 
7 Daltrop, Politics and the European Community, 6. 
8 Martin J. Dedman, The Origin and Development of the European Union 1945-95 (New York: 
Routledge, 1996): 58.    
9 Daltrop, Politics and the European Community, 6. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Dedman, The Origin and Development of the European Union 1945-95, 59.       
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Community as a potential nineteenth-century state with all the 
overtones of power implies. But we are not in the nineteenth century, 
and the Europeans have built up the European Community precisely 
in order to find a way out of the conflicts to which the nineteenth-
century power philosophy gave rise. 12 
 
Consequently, it was Jean Monnet who devised the strategies leading in 1951 to the 
establishment of European Coal and Steel Community. Robert Schuman, France’s 
Foreign Minister, turned Monnet’s plan for an ECSC into a reality linking France, 
West Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries in the first step towards the European 
Union of today.13 The Schuman Plan proposed to put German and French coal and 
steel output (industrial raw materials) under a joint High Authority, which was 
independent from governmental control and capable of enforcing its own decisions.14 
On 19 March 1951, the six European states, France, Germany, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Luxemburg, and Italy signed the Treaty of Paris, which established the 
supranational ECSC. The Treaty of Paris created a common market for coal, steel, 
coke, iron ore and scrap between signatory states.15 The objective of the ECSC treaty 
was to encourage economic development, growth of employment, and a rising 
standard of living in the member states through the development of a common 
market in coal and steel.16 Shortly it was designed to balance the six states’ particular 
vested interests in coal and steel and to facilitate achievement of national objectives 
in these sectors.17 Main points of the Treaty can be summarized as follows:18 
- The free movement of products and free access to sources of production; 
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- Permanent monitoring of the market to avoid distortions which could lead 
to the introduction of product quotas; 
- Respect for the rules of competition and price transparency; 
- Support for the modernization and conversion of the coal and steel sectors. 
 
The treaty created a High Authority operating independently from national 
governments, which was made up of 9 members appointed for six years.19 Besides, 
two other bodies created in order to provide means for protection:20 the first one was 
a Council of Ministers, made up of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. It was required 
that the opinion of this Council had to agree with the decisions of the High 
Authority. The second was an Assembly, made up of 78 parliamentarians from the  
6-member countries, which was given right to dismiss the High Authority.  
Jean Monnet prepared another plan named Pleven Plan for the creation of a 
European army for defense of Western Europe. In 1954, the treaty creating the 
European Defense Community was signed by the six. However, the EDC never came 
into existence due to the refusal of France’s National Assembly in 1954. This subject 
will be analyzed in chapter 2 in detail.   
The ECSC enhanced trade and production. It also enabled the European 
countries to develop and modernize their steel industry and made a significant 
contribution to the economic recovery of Europe. The following step in the European 
integration was the Treaty of Rome that established the European Economic 
Community. The Treaty aimed to provide economic development and political 
stability. It also established a common market, which is a free-trade area that 
provides free circulation of goods, labor, capital and free establishment of service.    
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1.1.2 The Treaty of Rome of 1957 
The treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were signed on 25 March 1957. 
The Treaty of Rome was an important step to establish the foundations of an ever-
closed union among the European peoples.21 The objective of the EEC was laid out 
in Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome: 
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a Common 
Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of 
Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious 
development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced 
expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the 
standard of living, and closer relations between the States belonging 
to it. 
 
The purpose of the EEC was to guarantee economic development and political 
stability in Europe.22 The two objectives of the EEC were liberalization of trade in 
order to promote a common market and ensuring the implementation of common 
economic policies by the member states.23 EEC ended restrictions such as price 
fixing, limiting production, dumping and all elements of protective government aid 
to provide free and fair competition.24 EEC designed an ambitious programme for the 
removal of tariffs and quantity restrictions to create a single common market, which 
would take place in three stages of for years each, starting in 1958.25 The Common 
Market mechanism focused on free circulation of goods, labor, and capital.26 The 
treaty included a twelve-year program in which to accomplish a customs union 
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where custom duties and quantitative quotas between the signatories were 
eliminated.27 Briefly, the EEC treaty’s provisions can be summarized as follows:28 
- The elimination of customs duties between Member States;  
- The establishment of external Common Customs Tariff;  
- The introduction of a common policy for agriculture and transport;  
- The creation of a European Social Fund;  
- The establishment of a European Investment Bank;  
- The development of closer relations between the Member States. 
 
Euratom’s objective was to provide the growth of a powerful nuclear industry at 
European scale.29 However, the nature of nuclear sector was complex and fragile. 
Since the Treaty touched on the vital interests of the Member States (defense and 
national independence), it had to scale down its ambitions.30 In other words, it is 
argued that Euratom’s activities blocked by the governments of the member states, 
especially by the French government that wanted to maintain control over this 
strategic sector.31            
Other countries, observing the economic growth and other benefits of the 
Community, considered applying for membership. In 1961, Ireland, the UK, 
Denmark, and Norway applied for membership. Ireland, the UK and Denmark 
eventually joined the Community in 1973, however the people of Norway rejected to 
join the Community.  
In 1968, the Customs Union was completed and common external tariff 
established. It was also guaranteed the freedom of movement for workers within the 
Community in order to establish common labour market. In 1978, Bremen European 
Council approved a plan to set up European Monetary System (EMS) and European 
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monetary unit (ECU). It was also decided that EMS would take effect retrospectively 
from 1 January 1979. 
Until 1979, members of the European Parliament were being nominated by 
the governments of member states. In 1979, voters across the Community got the 
chance to select directly members of the European Parliament.      
1.1.3 The Single European Act of 1986 
 
The Single European Act (SEA) was signed in 1986 and entered into force in 
1987. Its objective was to create by the end of 1992 a space without any internal 
borders and to provide the free circulation of goods, services, capital and persons.32 
The SEA was the first substantial change to the Treaty of Rome. It had three major 
objectives:33 first, creating a large internal market by 1 January 1993; second, 
increasing the role of the parliament; third, improving the decision-making capacity 
of the Council of Ministers. Community agreements on enlargement and association 
agreements were subjected to the assent of the Parliament.34 Besides, the SEA 
included various initiatives to promote integration in the spheres of social rights 
(health and the workers' security), research and technology, and environment.35 
Majority voting was accepted as a decision-making procedure. It replaced unanimity 
in four of the responsibilities of the community which are improvement of the 
common customs tariff, freedom to provide services, the free movement of capital, 
and the common sea and air transport policy.36 
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The Single Act gave the Community new competence for economic and 
social cohesion and set its objectives and means. One of these means was systematic 
use of the Structural Funds. The SEA strengthened the Community's powers by 
creating new responsibilities: a monetary capability, social policy, economic and 
social cohesion, research, technological development, and the environment.37 The 
SEA also strengthened Parliament's powers by making Community agreements on 
enlargement and association agreements subject to Parliament's assent.38 
1.1.4 The Treaty of Maastricht of 1991 
The Maastricht Treaty was built on the provisions of the SEA and 
strengthened its objectives and mechanisms.39 The focus of this treaty was presenting 
a plan for achieving full monetary and currency union among EC countries by 
1999.40 The Treaty required the establishment of a System of Central Banks, a 
European Central Bank, and a European Investment Bank. The treaty committed “the 
community to issue a single currency by 1999 at the latest; to increase the powers of 
the European parliament; to create a common foreign and security policy.”41  
The Maastricht Treaty modified the European Community into a European 
Union consisting of three pillars:42 the first pillar consists of the European 
Communities that provide a framework in which the Member States can exercise 
their sovereignty in the areas covered by the Treaties. The second pillar is the 
common foreign and security policy stated in Title V of the Treaty. The third one is 
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cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs stated in the Title VI of the 
Treaty. 
The treaty on European Union came into force on the 1 November 1993, it 
gave European integration a whole new dimension. The Treaty determined a 
timetable for Economic and Monetary Union. The goal was that the same money 
would be used in each member state. The treaty set strict monetary standards for 
countries participating in the new European Monetary Union (EMU) and adopting 
the euro as their currency. EMU membership required budget deficits of less than 3% 
of gross domestic product, a total government debt no more than 60% of gross 
domestic product and an inflation rate within 1.5 percentage points of the three EU 
nations with the lowest inflation. On 1 January 1999, a major step was taken by 
eleven member states when they locked their exchange rates against the euro. 
Besides, on 1 January 2002, twelve member states started to use the euro as single 
currency in the Union. Another development in the European integration process was 
the Treaty of Nice of 2000. The treaty determined the steps in the enlargement 
process of the Union.     
1.1.5 The Treaty of Nice of 2000 
In the Treaty of Nice, a new re-weighting of vote for the current and the 
future member States was reached. This new distribution of power is planned to 
come into force on 1 January 2005 in the case of current members.43 The new system 
gives 29 votes to the ‘Four Big Countries’ (Germany, France, United Kingdom and 
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Italy).44 In 2005, countries that have two commissioners (Germany, France, United 
Kingdom, Italy and Europe) will have one. At that phase, the Council would be able 
to decide on the size of commission without consulting any other body. Besides the 
Council would choose its members “according to a rotation system yet to be devised 
‘based on the principle of equality’ and reflecting demography and geography.”45 At 
the same time, the ceiling of 700 seats in the European Parliament, decided by the 
treaty of Amsterdam, has been breached to 732 seats for 27 member states.46 Finally, 
the subjects that are decided on a majority voting were increased to forty most of 
which are technical ones.47 However, governments’ veto is maintained in subjects 
that affected them in a high degree, such as cohesion (Spain), tax system (Britain), 
asylum and immigration (Germany) or free trade in cultural an audiovisual sphere 
(France).48 
After presenting the evolution of the European Union, the following parts of 
this chapter will analyze the objectives of the Union, the pillar structure of the 
Maastricht Treaty, and present the key institutions of the Union.   
1.2 The Objectives of the European Union 
The Treaty on the European Union was agreed in Maastricht in December 
1991. In fact, the EU was mainly a continuation of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) 1958-86, and the European Community (EC) 1986-91, under a 
different name. However, the institutional structure of the EC was different than that 
of the EU. The three communities, the ECSC, EEC and Euratom were sharing the 
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same Assembly- it is now called the European Parliament and Court of Justice.49 In 
addition, after 1967, the three communities have had a common Council of Ministers 
and Commission, thus these three communities were united under a common set of 
institutions.50 With the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, The European Community, which 
was essentially economic in aspiration and content was transformed into a European 
Union, which now stands on three pillars. 
The European Union’s mission is to organize relations on the basis of 
solidarity between the member states and between their peoples in a consistent 
manner.51 The major internal objective of the EU is to support economic and social 
progress, especially through the creation of an area without national borders, through 
the promotion of social and economic cohesion, and through the establishment of 
economic and monetary union.52 The main objectives of the EU as stated in the 
Treaty on European Union can be summarized as follows:53 
To assert the identity of the European Union on the international 
scene (through European humanitarian aid to non-EU countries, 
common foreign and security policy, action in international crisis; 
common positions within international organizations); to introduce 
European citizenship (which does not replace national citizenship but 
complements it and confers a number of civil and politic rights on 
European citizens); to develop an area of freedom, security and 
justice (linked to the operation of internal market and more 
particularly the freedom of movement of persons); to maintain and 
build on established EU law (all the legislation adopted by the 
European institutions, together with the founding treaties). 
 
On the other hand, the Maastricht Treaty provided a three-pillar structure; the first or 
‘community’ pillar concerns economic, social, and environmental policies. Besides, 
the pillar one determines the institutional requirements for European Monetary 
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Union. The second or ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (CFSP) pillar concerns 
foreign policy and military matters. The third or 'Justice and Home Affairs' (JHA) 
pillar concerns co-operation in law enforcement, criminal justice, civil judicial 
matters, and asylum and immigration. In addition, the three pillars possess a common 
institutional structure. The European Union has five institutions: the European 
Parliament, the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and Court of 
First Instance, the Council of the European Union, and the Court of Auditors. For a 
better understanding of the pillar structure of the EU, in the final part of this chapter, 
the structure and functioning of these institutions will be summarized. 
The main reason behind the implementation of the pillar structure was to 
add powers to the Community in the areas of foreign policy, security and defense 
policy, asylum and immigration policy, criminal co-operation, and judicial co-
operation.54 With the pillar structure, European Political Cooperation (EPC) was 
transformed into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European 
Union. It is argued that the significance of the pillar structure for CFSP was that the 
policy making was to be protected from the institutional mechanisms and traditions 
of the European Community.55 Besides, this meant the exclusion of involvement of 
the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, and the European 
Commission from policy making. With the definition of the CFSP as a separate 
pillar, the cooperation was to be provided on intergovernmental lines.56 In other 
words, the decisions would be taken by the Council of Ministers in a single 
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institutional framework rather than the foreign ministers of the member states 
meeting in the framework of the Council.57    
1.3 The Three Pillars of the European Union 
 
1.3.1 The First Pillar 
The first pillar is composed of the European Communities and it includes 
traditional cooperation within the European Community.58 It covers matters related 
to the Single Market and the four freedoms (the free movement of persons, goods, 
services and capital across borders.)59 This pillar also includes Community policies 
related to internal trade, development assistance, monetary policy, agriculture, 
fisheries, environment, regional development, and energy.60 In the first pillar, the 
Council generally takes majority vote decisions. For this reason a member state may 
be held to a decision, even if it disagrees with the decision.61 
1.3.1.1 The Common Agricultural Policy 
A secure food supply and a successful agricultural industry were seen as 
essential for economic prosperity and for the political stability in Europe.62 It was 
thought that if food prices and agricultural costs were allowed to differ widely in 
Member States, then free trade in manufactured goods would be destabilized.63 After 
the Second World War, each state was determined to protect its own agricultural 
economy and reduce dependence on external food supplies.64 It is argued by Mark 
Wise that France faced with problems of modernizing its manufacturing industry to 
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meet West German competition and for this reason France supported the launching 
of a CAP to perceive a clear advantage in the agricultural field where it possesses 
enormous resources in relation to other EC countries.65 Wise also argues that a 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) would provide France open access to the huge 
urban populations of West Germany, Benelux and, later the UK.66  
After all, CAP was needed to increase farm productivity rapidly while 
providing producers an adequate income and maintaining regular supplies of food at 
reasonable prices to consumers in Western Europe.67 
As stated in the Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome, the Common Agricultural 
Policy had five goals:68  
− To increase agricultural productivity;  
− To improve farm workers’ income;  
− To stabilize markets;  
− To obtain secure food supplies;  
− To achieve reasonable food prices.  
 
CAP operates under three basic principles that are market unity, Community 
preferences, and Community financing of the common price support system and 
other agricultural expenditure.69 Market unity means that farm goods circulate freely 
among all member states. Community preference means that the “prices of imported 
agricultural policies are raised at the EU borders by a variable levy that adjusts the 
incoming price to the internal EU price.”70 CAP provided a minimum price to 
producers for certain key commodities and “it protected that price level by a system 
of variable levies on imported products, counterbalanced by export subsidies to make 
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the products of European producers competitive on world markets.”71 The CAP has 
changed the role of Europe in world agricultural trade. By the 1980s, the EEC had 
become a major exporter of farm goods, supported by its export subsidies.72   
1.3.1.2 The European Monetary Union 
It is emphasized that the separate national currencies, which are subject to 
fluctuating exchange rates, was one of the barriers preventing cross-border 
cooperation.73 According to the Bretton Woods System, fixed exchange rates rested 
upon the continued determination of the U.S. to hold the price of its dollar at 1/35 of 
an ounce of gold.74 But, after World War II, gradually the U.S. economy became 
internationalized and its currency was subjected to the pressures felt by its trading 
rivals.75 So, the U.S. dollar’s stability became dependent on the policies of the U.S. 
government.76 Therefore, a more stable framework for commercial exchange rates 
was required. France, in conjunction with Germany, proposed the European 
Monetary System (EMS) in 1978.77 Besides, for France the EMS was seen as an 
instrument to use in the struggle to achieve a more balanced relationship with the US 
and the dollar.78 Economic union meant the establishment of common policies on 
economic management for the EC.79 The monetary union meant a single European 
currency and a system that tied together the exchange rates of national currencies.80 
One of the principal goals of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union was 
to bring German economic and political power under the EU’s multilateral 
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umbrella.81 Besides, the EMU aimed to provide greater stability of exchange rates 
among Community members and to promote a convergence of their economic 
policies to provide internal stability.82 The main objectives of the monetary union 
could be summarized as follows:83  
To finalize the completion of the single market by removing the 
uncertainty and costs inherent in currency-changing transactions, as 
well as costs of hedging against the threat of currency fluctuations, 
and by ensuring the total comparability of costs and prices 
throughout the Union; to increase economic activity; to reinforce 
Europe’s monetary stability and enhance its financial power. 
 
In April 1989, the report of the Delors Committee determined the achievement of 
EMU in three stages:84 
- First stage (1 July 1990-31 December 1993) consists of the completion of 
the internal market, increased coordination and cooperation in economic and 
monetary fields, strengthening the EMU. 
- Second Stage’s (1 January 1994-31 December 1998) basic tasks were to 
share in the coordination of monetary policies, to prepare for the third stage of EMU 
and the establishment of the European System of Central Banks, to oversee the 
development of the ECU. 
- Third stage (1 January 1999- 1 July 2002) will complete monetary union 
with the introduction of the ECU as the single currency of the EU. 
The ECU is seen as a key element in the system and a basket of the 
currencies of the Member States with four basic functions: “a unit of account in the 
exchange-rate mechanism; a base for determining divergence indicators; a unit of 
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account for operations under the intervention and credit mechanisms; a means of 
settlement between the monetary authorities of the Member States.” 85 
The European Council decided in December 1995 in Madrid to call the new 
European Currency as Euro. It will replace the ECU once EMU is fully established. 
The European Council also took decisions on the timetable and the modalities as to 
how the Euro should be introduced. It was foreseen that the final date for the 
replacement of national currencies by the Euro would be the year 2002. As it was 
planned, twelve member states started to use the Euro as their currencies on 1 
January 2002. The adoption of the Euro as the single European currency is likely to 
underline its significance as a major global currency in competition with the US 
dollar and the Yen of Japan.86     
1.3.2 The Second Pillar 
The second pillar is a structure for the development of cooperation in 
foreign and security policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The 
Community agreed at Maastricht that there should be Common Foreign and Security 
Policy in order to protect the fundamental interests of the Community and reinforce 
its global role.87 The reasons behind the launching of a CFSP, which are emphasized 
by the EU, can be summarized as follows:88 the first reason is the threat to 
international peace and security caused by regional conflicts occurring in the 
neighboring countries and regions. The second reason is the proliferation of weapons 
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of mass destruction, arms trafficking, contraband nuclear material, fundamentalism, 
and extremism.    
Because of the fact that Europe’s defense needs have changed, the Union 
has decided to take its own security measures. Besides, the Union decided that it 
should have enough capacity not only of acting in crisis management, but also of 
intervening to prevent conflict by trying to address the causes.89  
The European Union determined the following objectives under the second 
pillar:90  
To safeguard common interests; to reinforce the security of the 
European Union; to maintain peace in conformity with the principles 
of the United Nations, NATO, the Conference on Security in Europe 
(CSCE) and its so-called Paris Charter; to promote international 
cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights. 
 
However, the CFSP has some problems in its structure. A major problem is related to 
the lack of financial provision for the operations conducted under the CFSP. The 
Maastricht Treaty determined that operational expenditure may be charged to the 
Community budget. (Article J.11). Thus, this provision of the treaty caused the 
exclusively intergovernmental nature of the CFSP to become ineffective 
automatically, and it also initiated the involvement of the Commission, the Council 
of Ministers, and the European Parliament as the budgetary authority of the EU.91 
The second obstacle to the development of a credible CFSP is that the composition 
of the Presidency changes every six months. It is argued that the Presidency is not a 
visible and continuous player in the international arena.92 Because, the Presidency 
operates under a strict mandate from the Council in relations with third parties. This 
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limited mandate prevents the Presidency from representing the Union effectively, 
especially in crisis situations.93 Nevertheless, the situation is worse in practice of the 
CFSP: there is no independent body to be able to act independent of the national 
interests of member states.94  
In chapter 2 and 3, the security aspect of the CFSP will be analyzed more 
thoroughly. At Helsinki Summit of 1999, the European Council set the headline goal 
in terms of military capabilities. The Union decided to establish a Rapid Reaction 
Force (RRF) by the year 2003 including up to 60.000 persons, which is deployable 
within sixty days and capable of carrying out full range of Petersberg tasks. 
However, it is emphasized by the EU that this does not mean the establishment of a 
European army.95 The developments beginning from the European Defense 
Community (EDC) to the Helsinki Summit of 1999 will be analyzed in chapter 2, 
where the dynamics of European Security and Defense Policy of the EU will be 
further discussed.  
Under pillar two, the EU decided to develop civilian aspects of the crisis 
management in four priority areas defined by the Feira European Council: police, 
strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil 
protection. While the Nordic members of the EU strongly supports this development, 
southern members states of the EU, especially France and Britain, are more inclined 
to give importance to the development of military crisis management capabilities. It 
is also decided to reach the capacity to deploy 5.000 police by 2003. So, the EU’s 
civilian crisis management capability will be analyzed in Chapter 4. 
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1.3.3 The Third Pillar 
The third pillar covers various areas:96 rules and the exercise of controls on 
crossing the Community’s external borders; combating terrorism, crime, drug 
trafficking, international fraud; judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters; 
combating unauthorized immigration; common asylum policy. This pillar consists of 
police cooperation and cooperation in the area of criminal law. The Union’s 
objective is to develop common action in the fields of justice and home affairs by 
intergovernmental methods to provide citizens with safety within an area of freedom, 
security and justice.97 In the context of third pillar, two bodies were established. 
There are the European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction in Lisbon 
and the European Police Office (Europol) in Hague that is called by some as the EU 
version of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation.98 The European Monitoring 
Center entered into operation in the mid-1990s. It is charged with coordinating the 
collection and distribution of information and maintaining statistics on drug action.99 
Because of the rise in crossborder criminal activity, Europol was given task to collect 
intelligence and to analyze information.100 The third pillar activities also included the 
adoption of resolutions, recommendations, statements, and conclusions on issues like 
the interception of telecommunications and the financing terrorism.101             
September 11 attacks on the US caused the EU to focus on its interior 
security and reformation of its political system. New anti-terrorism laws were 
proposed. These laws aimed at combating terrorisms and freezing terrorist assets. 
However there has been resistance against these laws for the fear that they would 
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erode civil rights. The European Council held in Brussels on September 21 adopted 
measures to fight against terrorism, The central decisions were:102 assignment to the 
Council of Justice and Home Affairs for a European arrest warrant and a common 
definition of terrorism; strengthening of Europol, establishment of a team of security 
experts; prevention of the funding of terrorism by the adoption of a new directive 
against money laundering; measures to secure the safety of air transport. Under the 
EU's Justice and Home Affairs pillar, the EU intends to provide an area of freedom, 
security, and justice by 2004. The EU is also launching additional projects like the 
establishment of a European force for border controls. Besides, the presence of a 
clear security threat to societies of the US and the EU enhanced bilateral and 
multilateral coordination and data sharing between the US and the EU.   
EU proposals to change asylum procedures would allow the member states 
to exclude asylum-seekers when it is believed that they might possibly have been 
involved in terrorism. However, legitimate retaliatory action through the antiterrorist 
policies should take place with the consideration of guaranteed democratic rights and 
freedoms.103 Besides, the listening of civilians’ phone and email and a reflexive 
hostility toward Muslims at home and abroad may create a clear threat to democracy. 
Thus, the fight against terrorism should not weaken the basic values and rights of the 
people living in the EU, especially the Muslims. 
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1.4 The Institutions of the European Union 
1.4.1 The Council  
The Council consists of representatives of member states at the ministerial 
level. This brings together the ministers of the Member States of the Community, 
responsible for different areas of policies according to the agenda. For instance, 
agriculture ministers discuss farm prices and major Union issues are matters of 
Foreign Ministers.104 Each Member State acts as President of the Council for six 
months in rotation.105 The Council acts on proposals from the Commission and is the 
Union’s primary decision-making body. The Council’s role is to define political 
objectives, harmonize national policies and resolve differences between its members 
or with institutions.106 The Council approves the Community’s draft annual budget 
and presents it to the European Parliament.107 It adopts common positions, joint 
actions, and also draws up conventions on the fields of Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and justice and home affairs.108 Besides, the Council concludes the 
Community’s international agreements on the consent of the Parliament.109 The 
Council takes most decisions by a qualified majority voting. Each country has a 
certain number of votes in line with its population: Germany, France, Italy and the 
UK have 10 votes, Spain 8 votes, Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal 5 
votes, Austria and Sweden 4 votes, Denmark, Finland and Ireland 3 votes and 
Luxembourg 2 votes.110     
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1.4.2 The European Council 
The European Council consists of the Heads of State or Government of the 
Community Member States. The European Council meets twice a year. It normally 
takes decisions unanimously. The European Council deals with current international 
issues through the common foreign and security policy.111 Its task can be 
summarized as follows:112 
- Defining approaches to further the construction of Europe; 
- Issuing guidelines for Community action and political cooperation; 
- Initiating cooperation in new areas; 
- Expressing the common position in questions of external relations. 
1.4.3 The European Parliament 
The European Parliament provides a democratic forum for debate.113 It has a 
watchdog function and plays a part in the legislative process and shares the 
legislative function with the Council.114 The European Parliament exercises the 
power of decision on the internal market, the EC budget, the accession of new 
Member States and the conclusion of association agreements.115 Its parliamentarians 
are selected every five years. The Parliament currently has 626 seats. Germany has 
99 seats, France, Italy, and the UK 87 seats each, Spain 64, the Netherlands 31, 
Belgium, Greece and Portugal 25 each, Sweden 22, Austria 21, Denmark and 
Finland 16 each, Ireland 15 and Luxembourg 6.116 
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1.4.4 The Commission 
The Commission is the Community’s executive. It has 20 Commissioner (2 
each for France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, and 1 for the remaining 
countries).117 It acts as a guardian of the treaties and “ensures that regulations and 
directives adopted by the Council are properly implemented.”118 It can refer cases to 
the European Union’s Court of Justice. It also has an executive function 
implementing the decisions taken by the Council.119 Its power include:120 
- Upholding community rules and defending Community interests; 
- Initiating policies and proposals; 
- Implementing the provisions of the treaties; 
- Supervising the management of Community policies; 
- Administering funds and drawing up budgets; 
- Putting into effect the decisions of the Council of Ministers; 
- Mediation between the competing claims of the other institutions. 
 
1.4.5 The Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance 
It comprises 15 judges and nine advocates general appointed for a 
renewable six-year term by agreement between the member states.121 The Court 
provides that the European Treaties are interpreted and applied in conformity with 
the law.122 If any member State considers that another Member State has failed to 
comply with an obligation under the Treaties, it may bring the matter before the 
Court.123 The Court also gives preliminary rulings, in case a national court applies on 
the interpretation or validity of points of Community law.124   
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The Court of First Instance handles actions brought by individuals and 
businesses and appeals on points of law may be made to the Court of First 
Instance.”125  
1.4.6 The Court of Auditors 
It consists of 15 members appointed by unanimous decision of the Council 
after consultation of parliament. Its job is to watch over the financial aspects of the 
Community, to provide that money is not misspent and to highlight cases of fraud.126 
Besides, it prepares special reports and delivers opinions at the request of other 
institutions.127 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
Economic integration under the treaties of Paris and Rome established a 
community of nation states. Indeed, European integration was intended to serve the 
economic and commercial interests of the nation states. At the beginning, a major 
aim of the Monnet Plan was to get access to the Ruhr region’s coal and steel 
resources. The ECSC encouraged economic development with a common market of 
coal and steel in Western Europe. The establishment of the ECSC also became the 
first step towards the European Union of today. The Treaty of Rome established the 
foundations of an ever-closer union among the European peoples. The Single Act of 
1986 furthered the economic developments initiated by the ECSC. It led to the 
creation of an internal market and improved decision-making capability of the 
Union. 
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The most important step in the establishment of the European Union was the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1991 that established a three-pillar structure for an effective 
functioning of the Community institutions. The first pillar includes Community 
policies related to the internal trade, monetary policy, agriculture, fisheries 
environment, regional development, and energy. The EU launched EMU to provide 
stability of exchange rates among Community members and to promote a 
convergence of their economic policies to enhance internal stability. Under the pillar 
of CFSP, the EU wanted to contribute international crisis management purposes by 
using military force where appropriate, and to promote international cooperation, 
democracy, and human rights. The following chapters of this study will focus on the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY  
POLICIES IN WESTERN EUROPE 
 
 
Defensive military alliances were established in Western Europe after the 
Second World War. At first, these alliances were planned to be a safeguard against a 
renewal of German militarism, and later were developed in reply to fears of Soviet 
aggression.1 The Brussels Treaty Organization was established by Britain, France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg in 1948. The founding of the Cominform 
by the Soviet Union in 1947 brought the Americans, together with Canada, into the 
defense system of Western Europe through the North Atlantic Pact of April 1949.2 
After the outbreak of Korean War in 1950, the US proposed that West Germany 
should contribute to European defense. However, France was not satisfied with the 
proposal and French fears of a revival of German militarism led to their 1950 Pleven 
Plan for European Defense Community (EDC). France believed that the EDC would 
provide a way of controlling the proposed German Army under the supervision of a 
European entity.3 But the EDC never came into existence due to parliamentary 
opposition in France in 1954. In fact, during the Cold War, the need for such an 
organization was minimal due to the fact that the security of Western Europe was 
guaranteed by the US-dominated structures and institutions.4 But the end of Cold 
War altered the European security environment and created new pressures for foreign 
and defense policy cooperation.  
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In this chapter; firstly, the motives that led to the proposals for the 
establishment of the European Defense Community is presented. The reasons behind 
the failure of the European Defense Community are analyzed thoroughly. France was 
the state that proposed the establishment of European Defense Community, but 
France was also the state that prevented the establishment of European Defense 
Community. For this reason, France’s security policies after the World War II are 
discussed in the following part of the chapter. Security cooperation in Western 
Europe and divergences of security policies between Western European states during 
the Cold War is also discussed. Secondly, post-Cold War security policies in 
Western Europe are analyzed.            
2.1 The Failure of the European Defense Community  
The Pleven Plan, proposed by France, required the establishment of a 
European Defense Community, with a European Army, including German troops, to 
be controlled by a European ministry of defense responsible to a European 
assembly.5 The EDC was to be linked to a European Political Community (EPC) that 
would exercise democratic control over the EDC.6 The plan required that the EDC 
would have a 100,000 strong European army including West Germans and was to 
contain 50,000 strong French troops. In other words, the EDC was planned to be half 
French with the West German contingent controlled by a French military 
committee.7  
Britain declined to become a member of EDC. Britain also declared that it 
could offer the closest possible association, but not full membership.8 According to 
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the Dutch and British Foreign Ministers, the EDC was “as a means of French 
national aggrandizement and a platform for French political economy.”9 Besides, it 
was believed that the Pleven Plan aimed the European Army to be dominated by 
France, under French command with a French Minister of Defense.10  
After extended negotiations, the Treaty of Paris of 27 May 1952 establishing 
the EDC was signed. The Treaty was different from the original Pleven Plan and it 
had been revised according to the US Spofford Plan. However, for several reasons, 
the EDC Treaty was completely unacceptable for France:11 
- If the EDC was ratified, a European Army, including German soldiers, 
would come into existence and national armies would cease to exist. Moreover, 
German forces could be stationed throughout the community, for example in France 
or Holland.  
- Although the Pleven Plan required a French general being in overall 
command of a European army; according to the EDC Treaty, a Board of 
Commissioners, including German members, was to run it.                
- Article 43 of the Treaty stated that member states’ votes in the EDC 
Council were weighted by the size of their national contribution to the EDC. While 
Italy and Germany had 12 votes, France would have 10 votes. Due to its colonial war 
in Indo-China, France had decided to reduce its number of groupements in the EDC 
from 14 to 10. For this reason, France believed that West Germany would dominate 
the EDC. 
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As a result, France worried about the possibility of losing control over its 
own national army within a European force.12 This worry may also be seen in de 
Gaulle’s words:13 
We alone would be surrendering our army. To whom? To Europe? 
But it does not exist. We would be giving it to General Eisenhower. 
For centuries our value and prestige have been merged with those 
of the French Army. We therefore must not and cannot give up an 
army of our own. 
 
The EDC Treaty was rejected by the French Parliament in 1954, although it was 
ratified in West Germany, Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg.  
It is argued the US supported the EDC Treaty due to the fact that it could 
provide rearmament of West Germany for the benefit of the West.14 After the failure 
of the EDC Treaty, the US found another way to rearm West Germany by admitting 
it to NATO. In conclusion, it is emphasized that the EDC was intended a French 
device for keeping Germany out of NATO. Although the EDC Treaty did not 
materialize, as Fursdon states the EDC Treaty successfully delayed German 
rearmament and joining NATO for five years.15      
2.2 French Security Policies after the Second World War 
Since the beginning of the Fifth Republic (also under the Fourth) France has 
attempted to assert a foreign policy, which was ‘independent’, in Gaullist 
terminology.16 Several permanent features of French foreign policy resulted from this 
attempt: to claim great power status, nuclear strike capability, ties with Africa and 
the Third World. A French statesman, de Gaulle had vital importance in the 
reconstruction of France after the Second World War. Johnson maintains that de 
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Gaulle is remembered with his great achievements: the creation of free France, the 
post-war recognition of France as a great power and as one of the occupying force in 
Germany.17  
For a long time De Gaulle resisted establishment of the European 
Community, believing it as a threat to French sovereignty and to French identity.18 
But after returning to power he accepted the Common Market seeing that France 
could play the leadership role of Europe and thus gain greater leverage on the world 
stage.19 In order to provide French hegemony in Europe, de Gaulle believed that the 
Federal Republic of Germany was to be locked in and Great Britain locked out.20  
De Gaulle had clear principles. Firstly, Western Europe should be 
economically, politically and militarily an independent union. Besides, it should 
never be part of an Atlantic community dominated by the United States.21 There 
were two requirements for this:22 France had to be the leader. He believed that the 
French leadership was necessary to resist American pressure. Second, British entry 
into the Community would change the character of the Community, both politically 
and economically and would weaken the Community’s independence from the US, 
as Britain was too tied to the US. The second principle was that the EC should be 
based on the coordination of the policies of its members. There should not be 
supranational institutions that would exercise authority on the community. De Gaulle 
objected to any strengthening of the Community’s supranational institutions, 
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believing this to be a violation of sovereignty of the French state.23 But as a nuclear 
power and a united state, de Gaulle emphasized that France should dominate the 
Community and especially West Germany.24 De Gaulle had worked to establish 
national independence on the sole basis that France should have the control of an 
effective national security system.25 This goal was to lead de Gaulle in 1966 to 
withdraw France from the integrated command of NATO, which was dominated by 
the US.26      
2.3 Security Cooperation in Western Europe during the Cold War 
In general, the attempt to create an EDC in the early 1950s was a response 
to the need for German rearmament in a cold war environment.27 However, the veto 
of the EDC Treaty in the French Parliament in 1954 left NATO as the only defensive 
institution in Western Europe.28 The Brussels Treaty Organization was enlarged to 
include West Germany and Italy, and was renamed as the Western European 
Union.29 It was hoped that the Western European Union would develop beyond its 
existing purely defensive functions to become a forum for regular political and 
economic consultation.30        
The second attempt for defense and security cooperation in Europe was the 
Fouchet Plan, which was again proposed by France. The Fouchet Plan called for the 
coordination of national defense and foreign policies outside of the EC institutional 
framework.31 Wright argues that the objective of the plan was to integrate West 
Germany’s military forces within a Western European framework and to increase 
                                                 
23 Baun, An Imperfect Union, 14.   
24 Johnson, De Gaulle and France’s Role in the World, 94. 
25 Alan Clark, “Foreign Policy” in France Today, ed. J.E. Flower (London: Methuen, 1987), 107. 
26 Ibid. , 108. 
27 Baun, An Imperfect Union, 84. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Daltrop, Politics and the European Community, 12. 
30 Ibid. , 13. 
31 Baun, An Imperfect Union, 84. 
 43 
European independence of the superpowers.32 According to the plan, the major 
instrument for the achievement of a greater independence was French nuclear 
forces.33 However, when it was stated by De Gaulle that the Fouchet Plan did not 
extend to integrated control of French nuclear forces, other European countries 
expressed their disagreement and the plan failed.34 The failure of the Fouchet Plan 
left the WEU as the only European effort at defense cooperation.35  
On the other hand, the WEU never developed into a leading institution for 
the Western European security and remained moribund until the mid-1980s.36 The 
WEU, in the 1950s, was put into practice with nominal headquarters in London. Any 
proposal on defense that came from its Consultative Assembly was ignored by the 
member governments.37 There were two developments that saved the WEU from 
extinction:38 the first was the division of Western Europe after 1957 into the 
European Economic Community of the Six and the rest. After de Gaulle’s blockade 
of Britain’s application for membership of the Community, WEU served as a conduit 
between Britain and the Six. The second development was the French withdrawal 
from the NATO command structure in 1966. France suggested that WEU might 
provide a link between itself and NATO.  
In the mid-1980s, France made efforts to improve the WEU. Meanwhile, 
West Germany was beginning to question France’s own intermediate nuclear 
weapons and especially where they were targeted.39 It was reported that a significant 
portion of French public opinion favored that France should resolve ambiguities in 
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its nuclear targeting by extending its nuclear umbrella to Germany. However, Wright 
emphasizes that the Mitterrand administration remained indifferent.40 In 1987, the 
Netherlands suggested that the WEU was an appropriate body that could seek a 
common European position on a non-European issue such as the long-running war 
between Iran and Iraq and the deepening Persian Gulf crisis.41 At this stage, France 
also came to support the revival of the WEU as a mean to counter American 
withdrawal from Europe and to keep West Germany in line.42 Finally, the WEU was 
used to coordinate and organize West European contributions to the minesweeping 
operation in the Gulf.43 Besides, the WEU also coordinated the naval blockade of 
Iraq in 1990.    
In sum, security institutions of Europe, in particular the EDC and WEU 
failed to provide a security and defense cooperation in Western Europe during the 
Cold War. During this period, the security of Western Europe was provided by the 
US, and European defense was organized within the framework of US dominated 
institutions.44 The main reason behind the failures of these institutions was the 
divergences of the security policies between the leading states of Europe, especially 
between France, West Germany, and Britain. For Britain, the US security guarantee 
had primary importance. This attitude was based on three reasons:45 firstly, Britain 
believed that Atlantic-oriented security system also reflected its own interests. The 
relationship between NATO and Britain provided the British with cooperation in 
military matters, including collaboration in nuclear weapons, the sharing of 
intelligence information. Secondly, Britain believed that its European allies were not 
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capable of constructing defense arrangement that would be an alternative to NATO. 
Thirdly, Britain was uncomfortable with an image of itself as just another European 
power. Britain generally shared a global perspective rather than a regional one. This 
perspective proved useful collaboration with the US after the Second World War. 
Britain believed that the defense of Western Europe could not be provided by any 
organization other than NATO.46 
France was interested in achieving more cooperation in the defense and 
security affairs within the European framework. Its key objective was to diminish US 
influence in Europe and gain more French and European autonomy in security 
affairs.47 Besides France aspired to reduce the central role of NATO in Western 
European Security. French Policy makers also believed that NATO was a mechanism 
for US dominance in Europe.48 
Finally, West Germany faced historical restraints on its military role and 
was dependent on the US for conventional reinforcements and extended deterrence.49 
While France pressed for the establishment of an autonomous security system for 
Europe, West Germany emphasized NATO as the main element in the European 
security during the Cold War.50 Hence, the divisions in Western Europe some of 
which remain to date prevented Western Europeans to establish an autonomous 
security system and Western European Union to be an effective security institution. 
For this reason, Western Europeans depended on NATO for their security against 
Russian aggression throughout the Cold War.            
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2.4 Post Cold War Security Policies in Western Europe 
The end of the Cold War changed the European security environment and 
generated new pressures for foreign and defense policy cooperation. In the first 
place, the collapse of the Soviet Union replaced a stable bipolar order with a more 
uncertain security situation.51 Besides, Europe is no longer under the imminent threat 
of nuclear destruction; the fear that every crisis might escalate into an East-West 
conflict with all its potential implications has lost.52 However, the fundamental 
character of international politics has not changed and military power continues to 
play a role.53 Western Europe is facing new security threats that originated from 
political and economic instability in the former Soviet bloc and these new threats 
include ethnic and nationalist conflict, cross-border terrorism, massive immigration, 
destruction of the environment, and nuclear proliferation.54  
At the end of the Cold War, there were several reasons that have 
necessitated moves to develop a European Security and Defense Policy:55 first, 
German unification encouraged the deepening of European integration. This, in turn, 
revealed a need to bind firmly a united Germany into European political and security 
institutions.56 Second, the US began to withdraw a significant portion of its troops 
from Western Europe.  
As mentioned above, the WEU was used in the coordination of 
minesweeping operation in the Gulf and it had contributed to the naval blockade of 
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Iraq in August 1990. This led to French and German calls to promote the WEU. 
These calls were also supported by Britain albeit with some hesitation, because 
Britain preferred the WEU to move closer to NATO.57 But this conflicted with the 
French approach that was to move the WEU closer to the EC, and away from the 
US.58 Later, France succeed in having the WEU being brought into the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) and thus closer to the EU.59  
At first, Britain opposed the transformation of security and defense 
arrangements on a European basis.60 In a joint Anglo-Italian declaration of 4 October 
1991, a compromise was reached. A Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
was established under Title Five of the TEU. However, the objectives of the CFSP 
were left vague and poorly defined.61 Under the CFSP, majority voting was required 
in the case of joint actions and the member states had veto right over such issues.62 
On the other hand, the decision of the EC meeting at Maastricht to move for a CFSP 
and designate the WEU as the defense component of the European Union indicated 
that NATO was no longer the only institution in which Europeans would develop 
their collective security approaches.63 The Maastricht Summit declared that the WEU 
would be the defense arm of the European Union.64     
The tasks that were envisaged for the WEU were decided at the Petersberg 
meeting in June 1992. These tasks included three types of operations:  
- Humanitarian tasks, such as the rescue and evacuation of civilians from 
a zone of conflict;  
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- The deployment of armed forces for peacekeeping operations;  
- Crisis management.  
It was also decided that ‘decisions to use military units answerable to the 
WEU will be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of the 
UN Charter.’65 Besides, nine member states of the WEU declared that they were  
Prepared to support case-by-case basis and in accordance with [their] 
own procedures, the effective implementation of conflict-prevention 
and crisis-management measures, including peacekeeping activities 
of the CSCE and the United Nations Security Council.66  
 
Still the British government believed that the WEU was incapable of replacing 
NATO as the primary defense organization.67 Contrary to Britain, France pursued the 
proposal of a WEU operational capability within the framework of an EC defense 
policy during the Bosnia crisis.68 The issue of a WEU peacekeeping force was 
discussed at a WEU ministerial meeting on 19 September 1991, but no decision was 
reached at that meeting.69 Because, there were arguments between Germany and 
France on what type of operational capability WEU should have. While Germany 
insisted that WEU should have a peace-enforcement force, France pursued the option 
of a peacekeeping force.70 
 Just after the end of the Cold War, NATO declared a ‘broad approach to 
stability and security encompassing political, economic, social and environmental 
aspects, along with the indispensable defense dimension’ by the ‘Rome Declaration’ 
of November 1991.71 In addition, NATO forces were decided to be reconfigured. 
According to the new NATO force structure, the classic layer cake forward defense 
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along the former inner-German border in which the various NATO military forces 
were organized into national corps areas would be abolished.72 NATO military 
reform also included the establishment of a Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) on a 
multinational basis. The ARRC Corps would only be used within NATO territory, 
but it was also being discussed that the ARRC could respond beyond NATO’s 
borders.73  
France objected to the development of the ARRC. This was because, its 
abstention from NATO military planning, left France with no influence over the 
structure of the ARRC.74 Besides, the ARRC would be dependent on US personnel 
and equipment and it was not the European force type that France had wished.75 As a 
result, France, with the support of Germany, responded the creation of the Rapid 
Reaction Force with the establishment of Eurocorps with the Franco-German 
Brigade at the center.76 
The Eurocorps would have three missions:77 firstly, it could be used for the 
mutual defense of the allies under Article 5 of the NATO or the Treaty of Brussels 
(WEU); secondly, it could be used to preserve and restore peace; and thirdly, it could 
be used for humanitarian deployments. Contrary to the North Atlantic Treaty, the 
provisions of the Treaty of Brussels do not limit military deployment to the territories 
of the member states, and it also allows ‘out-of-area’ operations.78 After the 
declaration of the establishment of the Eurocorps, a debate emerged as to how the 
relation would be between NATO and the Eurocorps.79 Both Germany and France 
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stated that Eurocorps represents any threat to NATO.80 In the end, a special 
agreement was reached between the German and French defense ministers, and 
NATO’s Defense Planning Committee and the North Atlantic Council that give 
SACEUR ‘operational command’ of the Eurocorps as the main defense or rapid 
reaction force of the Alliance.81 According to this agreement, the Eurocorps would 
be a force, which could be deployed as a unified corps in the framework of the WEU, 
if NATO fails to act or Europeans decide outside NATO.82 According to Wright, one 
of the reasons for France to support the Eurocorps was that France was still unsure 
about Germany and wished to maintain a more flexible strategic position which was 
permissible under coalition security, but not under collective defense.83 
At the 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels, it was announced that the WEU 
would be able to use NATO military assets and headquarters for the conduct of 
European-only operations through the concept of the Combined Joint Task Force 
(CJTF).84 In other words, the WEU would have the politico-military leadership, but 
the forces and staff from NATO and WEU nations not represented in NATO’s 
military commands would participate in the conduct of operations.85 However, the 
CJTF concept was paralyzed by France. Because France was uneasy about European 
dependency on American military equipment, such as heavy air transport, and France 
did not want a WEU operation to be answerable to SACEUR.86 Besides France 
insisted on a blank cheque that gives Europeans a guaranteed right to access NATO 
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equipments if there was a need.87 This difficulty was resolved after France 
announced a rapprochement with the Alliance at the North Atlantic Council meeting 
in December 1995.88 This led to the signing of an agreement on the CJTF concept at 
the NAC meeting in Berlin in June 1996.89 In contrast to France, Britain 
continuously supported the CJTF concept from 1994 seeing that the Europeans 
would lack the resources and the political will to act independently.90 
In the second half of the 1990s, there have been significant developments 
for an autonomous European crisis management capability as the result of the Saint 
Malo Declaration of 1998, Cologne and Helsinki Summit of 1999. There were 
several factors that encouraged Europeans to rethink their commitments to defining a 
common European defense policy and capability during the second half of the 1990s: 
the first was the government change in Britain. Tony Blair, a Labour Prime Minister, 
was determined to take part in the restructuring of European defense cooperation to 
compensate for Britain’s self-chosen exclusion from major European projects, 
especially the European Monetary Union.91 The second development was the Kosovo 
operations that demonstrated the superiority of the US in military technology 
including intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance assets, precision-guided 
munitions, massive air and sealift resources, modern communications, and solid 
logistics. The Kosova experience showed that the Europeans could not support their 
diplomatic efforts with military means.92 In fact, the EU failed to take any 
meaningful joint action in Kosovo. The crisis in the Balkans required the use of force 
to stop bloodshed and enable the use of civilian measures for long-term stability in 
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the region.93 But the EU member states did not have the required strategic 
capabilities for a peace-enforcement operation. For instance, during the Operation 
Allied Force, US aircrafts delivered over %80 of the weapons.94 For airborne 
command and control, the allies were dependent on a US Air Force EC-130 Airborne 
Battlefield Command, Control and Communication (ABCCC), a C-130 designed for 
aerospace traffic control and battle management.95 Besides, with regard to air-to-air 
refueling, over %90 of the sorties were accomplished by US aircraft.96  
The third factor was the industrial urgency to consolidate the European 
defense industries and compete the US superiority and create an important economic 
initiative for cooperation.97 It was believed that while differences will remain in 
culture, education, language, an economically and politically integrated Europe could 
not exist without an effective common foreign and security policy to address the 
shared interests of the members of the Union.98  
As a result, on 3-4 December 1998 in Saint Malo, European defense gained 
momentum with the Franco-British summit. The Saint Malo declaration emphasized 
that ‘the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible 
military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to 
respond to international crises.’99 Besides, it declared that  
The Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for 
analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for 
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relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking 
account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its 
relations with the EU.100  
 
The importance of the Saint Malo declaration for the EU was that it would provide a 
beginning point for the Europeanization of defense in the coming years.101 In other 
words, it left open the possibility of European military action outside the NATO 
framework.102 But there were still differences of attitudes between France and 
Britain. Britain believed that a more robust European defense capability would not 
undermine the trans–Atlantic relationship and would keep NATO involved in the 
management of European security.103 On the contrary, France underlined the 
necessity of keeping European resources and decision-making structures independent 
of NATO.104 France also insisted that the EU should have the autonomous capability 
to act without recourse to NATO assets. France emphasized the urgent development 
of the European strategic transport and intelligence capabilities and the preservation 
of Article V commitment between the full members of the WEU.105 
The Cologne European Council Summit in June 1999 was a response to the 
aspirations of France. All 15 EU member states declared that  
The focus of our efforts therefore would be to assure that the 
European Union has at its disposal the necessary capabilities 
(including military capabilities) and appropriate structures for 
effective EU decision making in crisis management within the scope 
of Petersberg Tasks.106  
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The importance of the decisions of Cologne Summit was that neutral states, which 
traditionally avoided becoming part of defense and security institutions, also adopted 
the report.107 The EU member states also committed themselves explicitly to a 
common European crisis management capacity by declaring that ‘the Union must 
have the capability for autonomous action, backed up by credible forces, the means 
to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international 
crisis without prejudice to actions by NATO.’108 Besides, the definition of the crisis 
management was expanded in the Feira Summit of 2000. In the Summit, it was 
decided that the Union would develop its non-military crisis management 
capabilities.     
There were several developments that persuaded the neutral states to change 
their point of views. First of all, the neutral states were accused of not being fully 
committed to the goal of common foreign and security policy.109 For this reason, the 
neutral states were pressurized to redefine their neutrality by switching neutrality to 
non-alignment. They defined their policy as the pursuit of non-alliance policy in 
times of peace in order to permit neutrality as a possibility in the event of war.110 The 
change from neutrality to non-alignment was believed to give greater freedom of 
action, while preserving the core of neutrality. Besides, they have always preferred to 
refer defense in the EU context as crisis management, and not territorial defense.111 
Because, Sweden and Finland believed that the development of the EU into a defense 
alliance could harm EU enlargement, alienate Russia and cause tensions in the EU-
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Russia relationship.112 Thus, Finland and Sweden tried to show that they are not only 
committed to the CFSP, but also active and constructive by bringing the development 
forward with their own initiatives.113  
Secondly, non-aligned states wanted to participate on an equal footing in the 
planning and decision-making of Petersberg tasks within the EU framework. It was 
stressed in the final text of the Amsterdam Treaty that the non-aligned states were 
given not only equal participation and full decision-making rights, but also a 
distinction between crisis management and defense was made.114 The position of the 
two countries was further consolidated at the Cologne Summit of 1999. The 
declaration states that  
We want to develop an effective EU-led crisis management in which 
NATO members, as well as neutral and non-allied members, of the 
EU can participate fully and on an equal footing in the EU 
operations…. The different status of Member States with regard to 
collective defense guarantees will not be affected. The Alliance 
remains the foundation of the collective defense of its Member 
States.115 
    
Thirdly, Finland and Sweden insisted that the EU should get a UN mandate for its 
peacekeeping operations. The European Council of Cologne consolidated aspirations 
of these states by declaring that 
 The EU will thereby increase its ability to contribute to international 
peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN 
Charter…. The European Union is committed to preserve peace and 
strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of 
the UN Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and 
the objectives of the Charter of Paris, as provided for in Article 11 of 
the TEU.116 
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At the NATO Summit of 1999, the first significant step was taken in providing the 
EU with necessary assets. At the summit, NATO signaled its readiness to  
Define and adopt arrangements for the ready access by the EU to the 
collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in 
which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an 
Alliance.117  
 
After the Washington Summit of NATO, at the Helsinki European Council Summit 
of December 1999, EU members further committed themselves to a number of 
military goals: by the year 2003, the EU should be able to deploy up to 15 brigades 
for Petersberg Tasks on 60-day readiness and sustainable for at least one year, 
backed by airpower and warships, with its own planning staff and satellite 
reconnaissance system as well as decision making and operational capacity.118  
The main aim of the Helsinki summit was to have enough forces at hand to 
form a corps, which would be self-sufficient in terms of logistics, intelligence, and 
communications and to make ready for use in situation of a need in which NATO 
decides not to involve.119 At the North Atlantic Council meetings after the Helsinki 
Summit, foreign ministers replaced the tentative language of ‘presumption of 
availability’ of NATO capabilities for EU-led operations with ‘ready EU access’ to 
NATO collective assets on a case-by-case basis.120 Clearly, this does not mean an 
automatic access to NATO assets. NATO ministers also stressed that Helsinki 
outcome did not imply the creation of a European army and that non-EU NATO 
members would be invited to participate in both NATO and EU-led operations.121              
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2.5 CONCLUSION 
With the Helsinki Summit, the EU declared its the political will to possess a 
multinational army corps for crisis management purposes. The Helsinki Declaration 
outlines the capabilities that the EU thinks which are necessary for Petersberg 
missions. Crisis management became a distinct area of EU responsibility. Besides, 
crisis management was identified as the Union’s most important task in the field of 
defense, while it is distinguished from common security. The non-aligned states were 
uneasy about the Union’s development into a military alliance. Among these states, 
especially Sweden and Finland insisted that the Union should also address the non-
military as well as military dimensions of crises. Thus, at the Summit of Helsinki, it 
was decided to combine all civilian and military instruments to be able to respond to 
a variety of small and large crises. The non-military aspects of crisis management 
would be discussed in Chapter 4 of this study.   
On the other hand, there are various problems that seem to prevent the 
development of an effective military crisis management capability. One of the 
problems that seem to be the most important to some is that the EU lacks coherent 
and effective military capabilities. Narrowing the technological gap between the 
Europeans and the US may be difficult due to reducing defense spending in most EU 
countries. EU member governments spend approximately half as much on defense as 
the US and one-third as much on military research and development.122 While the US 
defense budget has gradually increased since the mid-1990s, European defense 
budgets have been decreasing. According to NATO figures, the US spends about 
3.2% of its GDP on defense, while UK spends 2.8%; Germany 1.5%, Spain 1.4% 
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and it is reported that defense spending of NATO’s European members has dropped 
22% since 1992.123  
In Western Europe, several obstacles that would hinder the development of 
an autonomous military crisis management capability seem to exist: a lack of 
cohesion and unity in Europe, an absence of a shared vision of strategic 
requirements, and an unwillingness to spend more than minimal levels on military 
capabilities. In the next chapter, whether the EU would be able to develop its own 
security arrangements for crisis management purposes in the coming years will be 
discussed. Moreover, NATO-EU relations will also be analyzed by focusing on the 
concept of Combined Joint Task Force.    
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND 
DEFENSE POLICY 
 
 
At the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, the European Union decided to 
establish a military force with an aim to preserve peace and strengthen international 
security. The European Council meetings at Cologne and Helsinki in 1999 decided to 
create a Rapid Reaction Force to accomplish Petersberg missions that would be 
operational in 2003. After the Helsinki Summit, NATO launched the Defense 
Capabilities Initiative (DCI) at the Alliance’s Washington Summit of 1999. It was 
emphasized that the aim of NATO’s DCI was to ensure that NATO could meet the 
security challenges of the 21st century and was prepared to deal effectively with 
crises like that in Kosovo.1 Briefly, in this chapter, a NATO proposal of Combined 
Joint Task Force backed up by DCI will be analyzed thoroughly. Besides, the 
outcomes of the Helsinki Summit of 1999 and future prospects for ESDP will be 
discussed. In Chapter 2, evolution of security policies in Western Europe was 
discussed. In Chapter 3, military dynamics of European Security and Defense Policy 
will be analyzed together with the factors that would hinder the development of 
European Security and Defense Policy.  
3.1 European Security and Defense Identity in NATO 
At the Berlin Summit of 1996, NATO declared that it would begin to build a 
European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) that would develop a more balanced 
partnership between North America and Europe. Creation of the ESDI would provide 
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a military force that are separable, but not separate, from the NATO force structure 
that could be available for use under the political direction and strategic control of 
the WEU.2 The essential elements for building an ESDI were making NATO assets 
available for WEU operations, adaptation of the CJTF concept for WEU-led 
operations, and providing transparency between NATO and WEU in crisis 
management3.       
3.1.1 Separable But Not Separate Forces: NATO’s Development of the 
Combined Joint Task Force 
The primary purpose of the CJTF was to provide the Alliance with a more 
mobile and flexible military to conduct contingency operations beyond NATO 
borders.4 The secondary purpose was to provide NATO resources in support of WEU 
operations for crisis response.5 In other words, CJTF would provide the WEU the 
capacity to realize a European-led capability under ESDI.  
The phrase of Combined Joint Task Force comprises three separate terms 
having specific military meanings:6 A task force is a military body, which is 
organized to conduct a specific mission or operational purpose. Joint operations 
include troops from different services like army, navy, marine and air force units that 
would cooperate with one another during an operation. Combined operations involve 
forces two or more nations. In brief, CJTF is an adhoc organization, which is built 
from existing headquarters to perform a specific mission. The equipment, personnel, 
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logistics support, and related assets would be assembled to conduct the operation and 
would be dissolved when the operation was complete.7   
Three types of CJTSs were foreseen:8  
- NATO-only CJTF, involving Alliance members and without any outside 
participation, 
- NATO-plus CJTF, involving as many members of NATO and PfP as 
desire to take part, 
- WEU-led CJTF, where the WEU uses NATO assets, including a CJTF 
headquarters, in its own operation.   
‘Separable forces’ means that European forces could borrow NATO and US 
assets. These assets provided the WEU with capabilities that WEU and EU members 
could not easily achieve on their own, while keeping decision making and political 
control over European security and defense activities inside NATO.9 In other words, 
the CJTF would operate within the integrated command structure, with SACEUR as 
the final commander. In case the operation was conducted only by European forces, 
the commander would be European and SACEUR would remain in the background 
as a supporting commander with consultative functions.10 Besides, it was emphasized 
that WEU would be able to use American heavy lift, command and control, and 
intelligence capabilities during the WEU-led operations.11  
3.1.2 WEU-led CJTF Operations 
During the WEU-led operations, NATO would provide a CJTF headquarters 
to WEU with the approval of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on a case-by-case 
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basis.12 The WEU could request the use of a CJTF headquarters for an operation 
under its command. But the activation of a CJTF headquarter nucleus for the use of 
the WEU required the decision by the North Atlantic Council.13 Besides, with the 
approval of the NAC, other alliance assets could be transferred to the WEU 
depending on the requirements of the operation.14 At an appropriate stage, control of 
the CJTF would be transferred to the WEU.15 
3.1.3 The Washington Summit of 1999   
At NATO’s Washington Summit of 1999, NATO agreed to support 
operations led by the EU where NATO was not engaged. NATO members also 
decided to make NATO planning, assets, and capabilities available to the EU on an 
assured basis while recognizing that nothing is automatic.16 In other words, NATO 
agreed to support EU-led operations, but did not give a blank cheque. NATO insisted 
that the permission would be given on a case-by-case basis.17    
Another development at the Washington Summit of 1999 was about the DCI 
that represented an intensive effort to modernize and improve Alliance military 
capabilities for a mission spectrum that ranged from peacekeeping to high-intensity 
conflict.18 DCI aimed to improve Alliance capabilities by achieving the followings:19  
- Mobility and deployability of forces quickly where they are needed, 
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- Sustainability: the ability to maintain and supply forces far from their 
home bases and to ensure that sufficient forces were available for long-duration 
operations, 
- Effective engagement: the ability to engage successfully an adversary in 
all type of operations differing from high to low intensity, 
- Survivability: the ability to protect forces and assets against current and 
future threats, 
- Interoperable communications, command, control and information 
systems, which are compatible with each other to enable forces from different 
countries to conduct joint operations. 
DCI identified the areas where Alliance capabilities, especially European 
capabilities, were most deficient including sea and air mobility, especially heavy lift 
capability, precision guided munitions, and command control.20 Consequently, the 
DCI put pressure on the European members of NATO to develop their defense 
capabilities.       
It is obvious that the decisions of the EU Helsinki Summit of December 
1999 provided a significant change in the evolution of European security 
arrangements. The EU marked its intention to absorb the WEU in the near future, to 
create a European rapid reaction force of 50,000-60,000 troops by 2003 for 
Petersberg type operations, and to set up the appropriate decision-making structures 
(including a Standing Committee on Political and Security Affairs, a Military 
Committee, and military staff).21 In other words, the Helsinki Summit of 1999 
showed the determination of the EU to become a serious security actor in its own 
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right.22 The absorption of the WEU into the EU removed the validity of the Berlin 
decisions of 1996, which developed a European Security and Defense Identity within 
NATO. 
At the Washington Summit of 1999, NATO had decided to assure the 
‘presumption of availability’ of NATO capabilities and common assets for use in 
EU-led operations.23 After the Helsinki Summit of European Council, at the North 
Atlantic Council meetings, EU foreign ministers replaced the tentative term of 
‘presumption of availability’ with ‘ready EU access’ to NATO collective assets and 
capabilities, but on a case-by-case basis and by consensus.24 
3.1.4 Factors Hindering the Future of Development of the CJTF 
Concept 
The CJTF generally lacks operational capabilities.25 Firstly, Barry argues 
that CJTF concept requires self-sustainment, which is a concept not often considered 
by Alliance planners that take into consideration the availability of extensive host 
nation support.26 It is possible that in most European led CJTF operations such 
support will be unavailable. Besides, the CJTF cannot depend on limited resources, 
which might be available for the population in need of assistance during 
humanitarian aid operations. Secondly, CJTF lacks interoperable systems. However, 
NATO has the NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS); NICS is 
essentially stable and not deployable. Thirdly, national doctrines on techniques such 
as transferring a sea-based headquarters ashore, defining command and control 
linkages between commands and airspace control should be improved and adapted 
for multinational uses. 
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There are three factors that could limit the future development of the 
CJTF:27 the unresolved fight for political control; the fact that solutions on paper do 
not always work in practice; possible internal resistance from NATO’s military 
bureaucracy. These factors are analyzed in detail below.   
The unresolved fight for a political control. France and the United States 
could not agree on a mechanism for political control over a CJTF. French officials 
argued that the CJTF should not become a part of NATO’s integrated military 
structure believing ‘that it was too rigid to accommodate limited operations and it 
lacked adequate political oversight’28 In fact, any CJTF under the integrated military 
command raises two important political problems for France:29 firstly, due to the fact 
that Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is always a US citizen, France 
believed that the US would have an implied veto over European action. According to 
the ‘separable but not separate’ concept, American officials would be involved in 
every decision making process that involved the use of alliance assets, even if they 
would not participate in a CJTF. Secondly, since France had withdrew from the 
integrated command structure of NATO in 1966, it would be excluded from some of 
the most important decisions. For these reasons, France aspired to establish a 
separate body to authorize and conduct CJTF operations. France wanted to construct 
a CJTF nuclei made up of European personnel. Besides, France proposed that 
missions that do not require the participation of US forces would be commanded by a 
European deputy SACEUR, who could utilize the pre-positioned European 
commands.30 This new CJTF command chain should report directly to the NAC or 
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WEU Council bypassing the integrated command.31 France also proposed that 
national commands and multinational groups such as the Eurocorps be ready to take 
the command of CJTF.32             
Solutions on paper do not always work in practice. In spite of the pledge 
that NATO would give its assets and capabilities to the European members of the 
Alliance or the EU to conduct independent military operations, the US would retain 
an effective veto over CJTF operations, since it insists on giving its approval before 
giving its assets. The success of the CJTF structure will depend on US authorization 
to give its assets and capabilities to the European command. If the US refuses to 
authorize the use of its assets, the CJTF will become redundant.33    
Possible resistance from the NATO military bureaucracy. Contrary to the 
high level military officials, many lower level officers (who would have to 
implement the CJTF) are less enthusiastic.34 This is because they would be asked to 
implement a CJTF outside their region; besides, another regional command could be 
given control over an operation within their territory. In addition, double-hatted staff 
officials would contribute a significant part of their time to CJTF planning by 
reducing their time, which is devoted to their regular command responsibilities. 
Second, some officers worry that the nucleus structure could weaken the strength and 
effectiveness of regional subcommands, especially in case their most knowledgeable 
people become double hatted.     
Another problematic issue is about the development of the Defense 
Capabilities Initiatives. While DCI goals have been included in the Alliance’s 
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defense planning process, the allies set no deadline for their achievement.35 Yost 
believes that as far as the European nation’s defense budgets are concerned, miracles 
should not be expected about the development of DCI capabilities.36  
The process that began with the declaration of Saint Malo of 1998 gained a 
new impetus with the decisions of the Helsinki Summit of 1999. At the Summit, the 
EU declared its intention to have a Rapid Reaction Force for crisis management 
purposes. At the Summit, the EU shifted its focus from the European Security and 
Defense Identity to European Security and Defense Policy.      
3.2 The European Union and European Security and Defense Policy 
On 19 June 1992, the Foreign and Defense Ministers of WEU member 
states met near Bonn to discuss strengthening the role of the WEU as the defense arm 
of the EU. At the end of the meeting, the Petersberg Declaration was issued. WEU 
member states declared that 
They are prepared to make available military units from the whole 
spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks 
conducted under the authority of WEU…Apart from contributing to 
the common defense in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, 
military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of 
WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue 
tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peacemaking.37 
 
Besides, in the Petersberg Declaration, WEU members decided to support conflict 
prevention and peacekeeping efforts in cooperation with the CSCE and with the 
United Nations Security Council.38 Later, the Petersberg missions were included in 
the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Amsterdam Treaty specified that the WEU is an 
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integral part of the development of the European Union, providing the EU with 
access to an operational capability in the context of the Petersberg missions.39  
After the Amsterdam Summit of 1997 came NATO’s air strikes against the 
Serbs in Kosovo. The impact of the Kosovo crisis was different for the evolution of 
European security arrangements for several reasons:40 One reason was the change of 
government in Britain in 1997. John Major, former Prime Minister, committed 
Britain to political and economic union, and a deeper European integration, but he 
was unable to achieve his goals due to the 1992 election results that delivered a very 
small Conservative majority.41 In other words, a group of Euro-skeptic 
parliamentarians and party constraints prevented John Major from being an effective 
leader in policy making.42 On the other hand, Tony Blair sought to give a leading 
role to Britain in the establishment of a European defense force after winning 
parliamentary majority in 1997. Another was the realization by the Europeans as to 
how close the US was to staying out this time. The third one was the military strategy 
used in Kosovo–to use airpower exclusively– by the US that implied US military 
superiority over the Europeans. Kosovo demonstrated that burden-sharing imbalance 
has become critical. Besides, it clarified that European military hardware was 
significantly inferior to the US with regard to strategic transport and logistics, 
intelligence (satellites, sensors, computers), and high-tech weaponry (precision-
guided explosives, cruise missiles).43 
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There were two reasons for Britain’s new thinking about European 
security:44 the first one was that the Prime Minister and his Labor government 
supported the European Union and wanted Britain to be an integral part of it. 
Because public hostility to the monetary union prevented them from joining the most 
important European project, EMU. Thus, they found another way to show their 
support for European integration. To date, dollar has been the dominant currency, but 
the introduction of Euro is likely to change the status of the dollar in the international 
monetary system and alter the power configuration of the world monetary system.45 
Euro would become a viable alternative to the dollar as an anchor currency.46 
Besides, the EU Central Bank would be independent of political control. Thus, the 
lower rate of inflation and the lower cost of holding money balances would be 
achieved.47 The second factor was that the realization that Europeans were not 
pulling their weight in a NATO dominated by the US and that the European Union 
was losing its political influence and military effectiveness. Tony Blair noted that:48 
We Europeans should not expect the US to have to play a part in 
every disorder in our backyard. The EU should be able to take on 
some security tasks on its own, and we will do better through a 
common European effort than we can by individual countries 
acting on their own. 
 
The inadequacy of the EU and the reluctance of the US to deal effectively with the 
crisis in Kosovo led the British Prime Minister to revise the European defense 
project.49 As a result, at the Helsinki Summit of 1999, EU member states committed 
themselves to a ‘headline goal’ for improved military capabilities for 2003. Headline 
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goal consisted of the formation of 50.000 to 60.000 troops deployable within 60 days 
and sustainable for at least one year. The EU also agreed at Helsinki to establish a 
number committees and staff organizations (military and civil) in Brussels to provide 
the necessary infrastructure for the ESDP:50 
- Political and Security Committee (PSC): It would be at ambassadorial 
level and responsible for the CFSP. During a military crisis, this committee will 
exercise political and strategic direction of the operation under the authority of the 
EU Council.   
- A Military Committee (EUMC): It was made up of the military 
representatives of national Chiefs of Defense and would provide advice to the PSC 
and direction to the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). 
- European Union Military Staff (EUMS): it would perform early warning 
and strategic planning for Petersburg tasks including identification of European 
national and multinational forces. 
After the Helsinki Summit, the Capabilities Commitment Conference took 
place on 20 November 2000 in Brussels. EU governments, except Denmark, made 
offers amounting to 100,000 troops, 400 aircrafts, and 100 ships for the rapid 
reaction force by the end of January 2001.51 But it was emphasized that operational 
capabilities were still lacking and crucial strategic capabilities needed improvement 
including strategic air and sea transport, command and control systems and 
particularly strategic intelligence.52 Consequently, participating governments agreed 
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that they needed to develop a joint capacity in heavy airlift, intelligence, fighter 
aircraft, and modern weapons.53     
At the Nice Summit, it was agreed to have a military staff of about 140 with 
its own headquarters on Avenue Cortenbergh, which would be established as part of 
the Council Secretariat attached to the office of the High Representative.54 In 
addition, the Nice Presidency Conclusions determined that the primary functions of 
the EUMS would be to perform early warning, situation assessment, and strategic 
planning for Petersberg tasks.55    
The Clinton administration reacted to the Helsinki decisions by arguing that 
it could decouple Europe’s security from that of the US, duplicate what NATO 
already does in a costly and ineffective way, and discriminate especially against 
European NATO allies that were not EU members.56 The EU’s response to the 
Clinton administration could be seen in the statements of Elmar Brok, the chairman 
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defense 
Policy of the European Parliament. He said that57       
Decoupling Europe from the US would not be sensible at all, 
because the strategic link which exist at present between both sides 
of the Atlantic Ocean is vital for peace and stability in the world… 
discriminating between the European NATO allies on the basis, for 
instance, of whether they are EU members or not, is not what we in 
mind: we should offer everyone the possibility of joining the EU in 
a military operation if we think that it might be valuable… we 
should avoid duplication but extra capacity needed...If the 
Europeans had been able to put more combat aircraft, more air 
refueling tankers, more electronic jamming equipment, more airlift 
capacity, etc. into the battle, it would have been better for the 
Atlantic Alliance as a whole. I do not think that American public 
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opinion would understand if the Europeans, in carrying out 
Petersberg tasks, were each time to ask the US for help through a 
CJTF equipped mainly by the US and run by US military 
personnel. This could even lead to isolationism in the US.     
 
In fact, there is a disagreement between France and Britain about the non-EU NATO 
members’ participation to decision-making process. Britain and France are 
discussing a three-part procedure for participation:58 appropriate structures would be 
established through which non-EU NATO members would be fully involved in 
decision-shaping, besides any actual decision to conduct an EU military action would 
be taken by the European Council alone, but the implementation would involve the 
states who wanted to be part of the operation. While France suggests that discussions 
should prioritize candidate states for EU accession, Britain gives priority to non-EU 
NATO members.59  
The possibility of unnecessary duplication of military capabilities worries 
the US and other non-EU members of NATO. This is because the EU may over time 
develop a permanent military structure that duplicates NATO’s integrated military 
structure. Moreover, this separate standing military structure may become an 
alternative rival organization to NATO and even finally ruin NATO.60 Besides, such 
an outcome is likely to constrain the ability of non-EU states to protect their security 
interests in Europe effectively.61 So, the development of an autonomous EU defense 
capability that does not undermine NATO and the transatlantic link would be 
difficult. On the other hand, discrimination against states that have considerable 
potential to contribute to Europe’s common defense–such as Turkey, Norway, and 
Poland– might distance these countries by creating tensions and dissent within 
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NATO.62 Besides, it would hinder Europe’s efforts to increase its military strength 
by excluding important sources of defense capability.63  
At this stage, the relationship between non-aligned EU member states and 
NATO also needs elaboration. Finland and Sweden are non-aligned states. But they 
prefer to participate in the peace operations. For instance, Finland became an 
observer in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992, Sweden in 1994. Both 
they joined the Peace for Partnership (PfP) program of NATO. Besides, they 
participated in the NATO-led IFOR, SFOR, and KFOR operations in the former 
Yugoslavia. Another non-aligned state, Austria became observer in Western 
European Armaments Group (WEAG) together with Finland and Sweden. The main 
policy of Finland and Sweden was to seek the principle of equation and full decision-
making rights during the development of the CFSP of the EU.64 They emphasized 
that it is important to make use of the resources and capabilities of all the EU 
member states without paying attention whether they are militarily non-aligned or 
NATO members.65 As a result, they achieved what they aimed at the Cologne 
Summit of 1999. 
We want to develop an effective EU-led crisis management in which 
NATO members, as well as neutral and non, allied members, of the 
EU can participate fully and on an equal footing in the EU 
operations…. The different status of Member States with regard to 
collective defense guarantees will not be affected. The Alliance 
remains the foundation of the collective defense of its Member 
States.66 
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NATO is concerned about a ‘right of first refusal.’ It is emphasized that NATO 
wants to be the primary instrument for criqis management in Europe,67 For this 
reason, NATO members have insisted that the ESDP should take the task when 
NATO as a whole is not concerned.74 But it is belidved that the notion of 'first 
refusal’ is contrary to the Europdan aspiration towards some degree of autonomy in 
relation to the US and NATO.69 Therefore, France rejected this proposal by arguing 
that discussions would first take place among EU member states on the principles 
related with EU-NATO negotiations, and after reaching the agreement between the 
EU member states, it would be possible to start negotiations with NATO.70 On the 
other hand, the UK and other Atlanticist members of the EU insisted that the 
negotiations should begin without delay.71   
3.2.1 The Challenges Ahead for the ESDP 
There are several divisions within the EU about military crisis management. 
The Nordic EU member states, namely Finland and Sweden, have supported the 
development of a EU crisis management capacity. On the other hand, they also 
insisted that conflict prevention should be included in the list of priorities of the 
CFSP. Moreover, Sweden pushed for putting civilian crisis management on an equal 
footing with military crisis management.72 Sweden also concentrated on employment 
policy, gender equality, environment, and consumer production while it seemed to 
show less interest in the problematic issues of the CFSP.73  
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Both Finland and Sweden argue that the EU peacekeeping operations should 
be mandated by the UN. According to them, a mandate by the UN represents the 
support of international community.74 Another problematic issue is related with 
Finland. With a parliamentary decision in 1995, Finland began to participate in 
peacekeeping operations in order to make use of force for humanitarian tasks. For 
instance, Finland participated in the implementation and stabilization forces in 
Bosnia as well as in KFOR.75 However, the law prohibits Finnish participation in 
peace-enforcement operations.76 Sweden can participate in peace enforcement 
operations, although the certain size and capability of force needs parliamentary 
approval.  
The nomination of Javier Solana as WEU Secretary General was opposed 
by Finland and Sweden. Javier Solana was also the High Representative for the 
CFSP. For this reason, Finland and Sweden argued that this double-hatting means 
that ‘Mr CFSP’ in his WEU role also deals with the questions linked to common 
defense, and that common defense enters the EU by this way.77           
There are also debates about the size of the Rapid Reaction Force. Britain 
argues that the force should be capable of conducting operations at the low-end of 
Petersberg tasks, while France aims high.78 It is also discussed what is the 
apppopriate methodology for creating an efficient RPF. France and the UK promotes 
the ‘bottom up’ approach that relies on voluntary national contributions, while 
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Germany promotes the ‘top-down’ approach that requires the acting of Council of 
Defense Ministers on advice from the EU military committee.79   
The challenges ahead of the ESDP can be summarized as follows: 
- The insufficiency of 50,000-60,000 troops for Petersberg tasks,  
- A lack of political cohesion and unity in Europe, 
- The nationalistic rivalries and disputes in the defense industry, 
- Declining level of military capabilities, and unwillingness to spend more 
than minimal levels on military capabilities, 
- An absence of shared vision of strategic requirements, 
- The deficiency of qualified majority voting, 
- The debate about the types of Petersberg missions. 
The insufficiency of 50,000-60,000 troops for Petersberg tasks. It is not 
clear whether an autonomous EU military force of 50,000-60,000 troops would be 
sufficient for Petersberg type missions. Besides, it is unclear whether the goal of 
50,000-60,000 troops will include the forces of EU member states which are on duty 
at present in Bosnia and Kosovo, on the assumption that NATO-led peacekeeping 
forces would still be deployed in the Balkans in 2003.80 In August 2000, 40,000 
troops from EU countries, 27,344 troops in KFOR and 12,000 troops in SFOR, were 
serving in the Balkans.81 Besides, there remains another unanswered question as to 
whether EU member states will be prepared to generate 180,000 troops that would be 
required for regular rotations of a force of 60.000 troops.82    
  A lack of political cohesion and unity in Europe. Moens emphasizes that 
there is the absence of a concrete agreement among the member states on threats, 
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strategic vision, and operational contingencies.83 This disagreement still continues 
between the three dominant military powers in the EU– Germany, the UK, and 
France. These three states generally disagree about the optimal degree of military 
integration within European military institutions and the US’ role in Europe within 
the NATO framework.84 However, Peter Van Ham argues that 
All three countries have made pragmatic moves to accommodate 
each other’s traditional strategic positions on the management of 
European security and defense. France has abandoned its dream of 
an independent European defense (i.e. without relying on the US); 
Germany has accepted that it must participate in military operations 
if it wants to be considered as a full European player in the defense 
field; and Britain has given up its opposition to a Europe-only 
involvement in defense matters where the EU will be playing 
central role.85 
 
For instance, it is emphasized that differences in security culture between Britain and 
France remain considerable:86 issues such as state versus market/civil society; 
territorial defense versus force projection; conscription versus professionalism; 
integration versus cooperation; deepening versus enlargement; institutional priorities 
versus capabilities; strategy versus tactics; political will versus pragmatism; and 
above all, Europeanism versus Atlanticism. In addition, it is argued that while France 
thinks that the emergence of an effective ESDP would create a more balanced 
Atlantic Alliance, the UK fears that the opposite would be the case: if Europe 
demonstrated a serious capacity to manage its own security affairs, the US would 
move back to isolationism and NATO would collapse.87 While, for France, the ESDP 
is first and a leading European project to make use of the Atlanticist instrument, 
                                                 
83 Moens, European Defense and NATO, 266. 
84 Sarah Tarry, A European Security and Defense Identity: Dead on Arrival? (Canada: The Canadian 
Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998), 7.  
85 Peter Van Ham, “Europe’s Precarious Center: Franco-German Co-operation and the CFSP,” 
European Security 8, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 17.  
86 Michael Clarke, “French and British Security: Mirror Images in a Globalized World” International 
Affairs 76, no.4  (October 2000), 734.       
87 Howorth, Britain, France and the European Defense Initiative, 33. 
 78 
NATO, for the UK, is the best mean of maintaining the Atlantic Alliance.88 Besides, 
Britain is more inclined than France in terms of developing the EU’s military 
capability within the NATO framework and in cooperation with the US.89         
In the Post Cold War era, Germany insisted on continuing in its integration 
into Western Alliance system, besides it proposed an acceleration of European 
integration.90 Germany appears unwilling to commit to further military involvement 
in multilateral task forces, whilst paying attention to its responsibilities as a NATO 
and EU member.91 Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister, emphasized that 
European security and defense capability is not about the militarization of the EU, 
and the EU must be made an effective and decisive power, which is able to reinforce 
the rule of law and renounce violence.92 Germany’s participation in the Kosovo air 
strikes was based on a commitment to humanitarian and democratic values and on a 
desire to show solidarity with its Western allies.93 In fact, Germany has tried to 
influence EU security policy in the direction of non-military endeavors in which 
political cooperation is more important than military intervention.94 It could be 
argued that this is the reason why Germany assumed an important role in the 
implementation of the Stability Pact to provide regional security, development in 
democracy, human rights, and economy to South Eastern Europe. This, in many 
ways, emphasizes the civilian power approach of Germany. The Stability Pact for 
Southeast Europe will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 4. 
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Another problematic issue is the lack of consensus among Western 
European states on what kind of role the European Union should play as a unitary 
actor on the world arena.95 Van Ham argues that the Maastricht Treaty does not 
specify whether the EU should eventually evolve into a full superpower, a regional 
power, a civil power or a rather complex entity with a mixed character.96 In other 
words, the purpose and resources of the CFSP are not clearly defined.97 On the other 
hand, many European states are preoccupied with internal economic and political 
issues. This could result in differing perceptions of threat and interpretations over the 
implementation of a CFSP.98 Besides, differing threat perceptions could lead to 
disagreement over security burden sharing and this could incline some states towards 
renationalizing their defense structures.99  
Another unresolved problem is how to ensure the participation of different 
European countries in relation to the security organizations to which they belong.100 
Ten of the 15 EU member countries are also members of the WEU; four (Austria, 
Finland, Ireland and Sweden) are not members of NATO, and are observers in the 
WEU; one (Denmark) is a NATO member, but observer in the EU. There are six 
European countries (Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Poland, Czech Republic and 
Hungary), which are members of NATO, but not members to the EU and the 
WEU.101 The EU enlargement in 1995 to include Sweden, Finland, and Austria 
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further deepened the gap between EU and NATO membership.102 These three 
countries are non-aligned states. They are also active in NATO’s PfP. But they are 
not members of NATO.  
Hyde-Price argues that two different security zones have emerged within the 
EU: while one group of EU member states are covered by NATO’s Article V 
security guarantees, a group of non-aligned EU member states do not take part in 
military alliances.103 It is also emphasized by French President Mitterrand that 
‘contradictions [between the northern and southern EU member states] are beginning 
to emerge, and we must prevent them from becoming lethal’.104 As a result, the 
inclusion of neutral states to the EU added potential problems of using military 
means in a European foreign policy as it is discussed at the beginning of this part.105  
The nationalistic rivalries and disputes in the defense industry. Most 
European governments remain reluctant to open their defense markets for 
competition. It is argued that larger EU member states do not want to lose national 
autonomy over their defense industries.106 Besides, they fear an increase in 
unemployment in the defense sector,107 and they are concerned about maintaining 
technological and production capabilities rather than buying security at the lowest 
possible cost.108 For instance, it is argued that France spends more than 90 percent of 
its defense budget within the country, and it is a matter of concern whether France 
would be prepared to admit the rights of non-French companies to tender for French 
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defense contracts.109 In France, in 1997, out of 16,992 transactions done by the 
Ministry of Defense, 10,218 were subject to restricted invitations to tender or not 
open to competition.110 Again, in the United Kingdom in the period 1996-97, of 730 
contracts awarded (56% of which were open invitations to tender) 95% were won by 
British companies.111 So, it is emphasized that this fragmented industrial defense 
sector is far from producing what Europe needs.112 The fragmented industrial sector 
and nationalistic rivalries over the control and costs of development programmes has 
caused the cancellation of projects which were vital for a credible military capability 
of the EU, such as in the case of the German refusal to help France fund the 
development of two Helios 2 infrared optical satellites and the cancellation of 
Horizon frigate.113  
In 1999, critical European consolidations in defense industry took place. 
British Aerospace and GEC-Marconi in the UK merged by creating BAE Systems. 
The negotiations between Aerospatiale-Matra of France, Dasa of Germany, and 
CASA of Spain leaded to the formation of the European Aeronautic, Defense and 
Space Company (EADS). Together with Thales (the former Thomson-CSF), it is 
argued that these three defense contractors represent the three poles of the new 
European defense industry structure and that will be major players in future 
transatlantic developments.114 Besides, these three large groups contracted to develop 
joint ventures with the US defense contractors:115 Patriot PAC-3 upgrade for German 
army by Lockheed Martin (US), EADS (France/Germany/Spain); Meteor missile by 
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Matra BAe (British Aerospace) Dynamics (France/UK), Alenia Marconi Systems 
(Italy), EADS (France/Germany/Spain), Saab Dynamics (Sweden), Boeing (US); 
Lockheed Martin Alenia Tactical Transport Systems by BAE Systems (UK), 
Lockheed Martin (US).  
Moens emphasizes that European defense need to be rationalized for the 
harmonization of common equipment, and practicability of common training and 
interoperability.116 He believes that European armies are still overstaffed and under 
equipped for modern operations; even the Eurocorps lacks sophisticated intelligence, 
effective chain of logistics, and power projection capability.117  
Declining level of military capabilities, and unwillingness to spend more 
than minimal levels on military capabilities. In fact, there is reluctance among 
European states to increase defense spending to create an effective military force 
with a satellite intelligence system that would provide the required capability for 
independent actions.118 It is believed that without the Soviet threat, which required 
large and prepared standing military forces in Europe, governments on both sides of 
the Atlantic have been unable to maintain Cold War levels of military spending.119 
The reduced defense spending in Europe depends on three factors: economic growth, 
threat perception and the significance of social priorities other than national 
defense.120 The increased demand for pensions and health care is likely to limit 
defense spending in all NATO countries.121 Besides, it is also argued that higher 
unemployment rates and the fiscal requirements set by the Maastricht Treaty for 
accession to EMU have pressurized on governments to rearrange their expenditures 
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away from defense.122 Therefore, the growing pension and health care demands of 
ageing populations of Europe is likely to make it difficult for European governments 
to increase their defense budgets.123 In addition, endeavors like reconstruction of the 
Balkans economically provides new burdens on European budgets, thus limits the 
funds available for military capabilities improvement.124         
The deficiency of qualified majority voting. It is argued that the EU 
decision-making process is based on mutual agreements between different states and 
group of states, especially between the richer states of north, and the poorer southern 
states including Ireland.125 Besides, it is believed that reformation of EU decision-
making structures may increase tensions between larger and smaller states within the 
EU including qualified majority voting.126 The Amsterdam Treaty introduced 
majority voting for decisions concerning the implementation of agreed policies and 
allowed constructive abstention so that a country may choose not to participate a 
decision rather than veto it.127 Constructive abstention provides the conduction of 
common policies and joint actions without receiving the support of neutrals such as 
Ireland or Austria.128 According to constructive abstention, one or more states will be 
able to declare formally that they are abstaining from a decision to launch a military 
operation, but they will be obliged to give their political support.129 This will allow 
states that have specific interests or are in close proximity to the arena of crisis to 
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qualify their attitude on EU military action.130 On the other hand, if one-third of the 
members vote for constructive abstention, the decision will not be adopted.131 
Besides, there are two loopholes related with qualified majority voting: 132 firstly, any 
member may block qualified majority voting for important and stated reasons of 
national policy. Secondly, qualified majority voting does not apply to decisions of 
having military or defense implications. 
The debate about the types of Petersberg missions. It is believed that there 
are three types of Petersberg missions:133 large scale operations of the Kosovo type, 
which are likely to be NATO-led; medium-scale operations (such as February 2000 
Crisex-2000 exercise jointly conducted by the WEU and NATO) that are intended to 
be EU-led operation with NATO assets; and small scale operations that the EU will 
be able to conduct without NATO assets. While Britain assumes that the first two 
types require serious operational preparation, France concentrates on the latter 
two.134 At this stage, it was also debated whether the EU should focus on the low end 
of Petersberg scale (rescue missions and peacekeeping) and leaving the high end 
(peace enforcing) to NATO.135 In addition, most of the EU member states 
emphasizes that the EU should acquire a military capability to address the low end of 
Petersberg tasks.136 But, it should be kept in mind that what is low intensity at the 
macro-level can very quickly become a high intensity from the perspective of the 
soldier on the ground.137 As a result, military force of the EU should be prepared for 
a possible worst-case scenario in an operation and this requires a force supported by 
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highly developed technology, timely logistics capabilities, and well-established lines 
of communication.     
 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
At the Berlin Summit of 1996, NATO began to develop ESDI to provide a 
more balanced partnership between North America and Europe. NATO decided to 
make its assets available for WEU operations and adapted the CJTF concept for 
WEU-led operations. At the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the EU decided to absorb the 
WEU in the near future, and to create a Rapid Reaction Force of 50,000-60,000 
troops by 2003 for Petersberg missions. As a result of this development, at the North 
Atlantic Council meetings in 1999, it was declared that NATO would provide ready 
EU access to NATO collective assets and capabilities, but on a case-by-case basis 
and consensus. However, there are various problems hindering the development of 
the CJTF concept. Firstly, NATO is concerned about a ‘right of first refusal’. Some 
EU member states, in particular France, rejects NATO’s this approach by arguing 
that the notion of ‘first refusal’ is contrary with European aspiration towards some 
autonomy in relation to the US and NATO. Secondly, France and the United States 
could not agree on a mechanism for political control over a CJTF. Thirdly, it is 
argued by some that CJTF lacks operational capabilities. Fourthly, many lower level 
officers who would have to implement the CJTF might be less enthusiastic.       
There are also several divisions within the EU about crisis management. 
These divisions affect the development of ESDP in a negative way. One of the 
divisions is the development of non-military crisis management capabilities as well 
as military ones. Nordic EU member states supports the development of non-military 
crisis management in the EU. Another division is the lack of political cohesion 
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among EU member states about the development of ESDP. At this stage, the 
divergences of policies among France, Britain, and Germany appear. 
There are also several challenges ahead for the ESDP. First, it is still 
debated whether a force of 50,000-60,000 troops would be enough for military crisis 
management missions. Second, Western European states are reluctant to spend more 
than minimal levels on military capabilities. For this reason, military budgets are 
decreasing in Western European states due to economical reasons. Third, there are 
nationalistic rivalries and disputes in the defense industry that would hinder the 
development of European defense industry. Fifth, EU member states cannot agree on 
which types of Petersberg missions would be conducted by the Rapid Reaction 
Force. While most of the EU member states emphasize that the EU should acquire a 
military capability to address the low end (small scale operations) of Petersberg 
missions, Britain concentrates on large (Kosovo type) and medium scale operations.           
As it was stated above, one of the divisions in the European Union is about 
development of non-military crisis management capability. Nordic EU member 
states, in particular Sweden and Finland, has been seen to guard against the 
dominance of military means within EU crisis management initiative.138 With the 
initiative of Finland and Sweden, the Helsinki Summit of 1999 approved a report on 
non-military crisis management. This report stated that the EU decided to establish a 
non-military crisis management mechanism to coordinate and make more effective 
the civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones. Thus, in Chapter 
4, non-military crisis management in the EU will be discussed.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NON-MILITARY CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT 
The EU was set up by the Treaty of Rome in 1958 as an attempt to maintain 
peace in Europe and achieve prosperity by cooperation.1 The EU aimed to prevent 
differences between members developing into a conflict.2 The EU has developed 
common policies for creating a zone of freedom and justice, relevant for its citizens.3 
For instance, since there were different levels of economic development and 
resources throughout the EU, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was launched 
to transfer wealth from one part of the EU to another.4 EMU would also realize an 
area in which goods, services, people, and capital will circulate freely and without 
competitive distortions.5 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) also aimed to 
guarantee a reasonable standard of living for the farming population.6 Moreover, 
CAP was launched to guarantee fair food prices for the consumers.7 The European 
Council founded the Court of Human Rights that can give judgments in favor of 
individuals and against the states that recognize its right to judge.8 In addition, 
economic integration has provided an effective security instrument for the member 
states.  
                                                 
1 Anne Daltrop, Politics and the European Community (Hong Kong: Longman, 1982), viii. 
2 Sverre Stub, “European Crisis Management from the Norwegian Perspective,” in EU Civilian Crisis 
Management, Graeme P. Herd and Jouko Huru, eds. (Surrey: Conflict Studies Research 
Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2001): 15. 
3 Jaakko Blomberg, “Non-Military Crisis Management as a Security Means in the EU,” in EU Civilian 
Crisis Management, Graeme P. Herd and Jouko Huru, eds. (Surrey: Conflict Studies 
Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2001): 12   
4 Daltrop, Politics and the European Community, 166. 
5 Ibid. , 167. 
6 Derek W. Urwin, The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945 (New 
York: Longman Inc., 1991), 133. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Daltrop, Politics and the European Community, 49. 
 88 
In the post-Cold War era, ethnic conflicts emerged in the former 
Yugoslavia. As it was witnessed, the EU engagement in preventive diplomacy had 
been unsuccessful in the conflicts of 1990s in the Balkans due to the lack of political 
will and ineffective means.9 Therefore, at the Helsinki Summit of 1999, The EU 
added military dimensions to its previous policies to provide a strengthened ability to 
enforce respect for democratic norms and practices.10 On the other hand, it is 
believed that military capabilities could provide a secure environment, but the 
military could not build a society, with its infrastructure, basic services and 
administration.11 For this reason, it was decided to combine all civilian and military 
instruments to be able to respond to a variety of small and large crises.12 However, it 
was argued a coordinated civilian action should relieve human emergencies and 
stabilize the situation in crisis areas.13       
Although the EU from the beginning has been involved in conflict 
prevention and crisis management, the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam 
introduced new instruments for political/diplomatic and security/military action 
under the CFSP and the ESDP. Besides, the European Councils in Cologne, Helsinki, 
Feira, Nice, and Göteborg required that the EU should develop the full range of 
civilian and military means for an effective conflict prevention and crisis 
management.14 At the Saint Malo Conference of 1998, France and Britain declared 
that the EU must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible 
military forces in order to respond to international crises. On the other hand, whilst 
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emphasizing the importance of military crisis management in the EU, the Nordic 
states of the EU, in particular Finland and Sweden also pushed for non-military crisis 
management as well as military crisis management. Otherwise, they would not 
support the Saint Malo decisions. Therefore, the bargaining process between 
southern and northern EU member states after the Saint Malo Conference of 1998 led 
to the approval of non-military crisis management in the EU at the Helsinki Summit 
of 1999.      
The key success of the EU in non-military crisis management was the 
Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. This attempt also underlined the civilian power 
approach of the EU15: the Stability Pact is a huge operation aimed at stabilizing and 
integrating the Southeast Europe into EU and NATO. In the first part of this chapter, 
development of non-military crisis management in the EU will be analyzed. In the 
second half of the chapter, the Stability Pact will be analyzed and its outcomes will 
be evaluated. 
4.1 Non-military Crisis Management in the European Union 
The conflicts in the Balkans required the use of force. This is because the 
diplomatic attempts to stop the bloodshed proved unsuccessful. For this reason, 
peace enforcement operations were required to end the violent conflicts in the region. 
However, not only there are problems arising from ethnicity and rebirth of 
nationalism in the former Yugoslavia, but also there are social problems such as 
unemployment and poverty. These problems require the use of civilian means for the 
solutions of the crisis and long-term stability in the region.16  
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Effective crises management requires careful planning and comprehensive 
strategy.17 In other words, today’s peace operations have three components:18 
military measures, civilian security measures, other civilian measures. The first 
component is to bring to an end to open conflict if other measures fail, and to prevent 
new military confrontations. The second component is about civilian security, law 
and order. It also includes upholding the functions of police, courts and prisons. The 
third component includes the establishment of new political institutions, holding free 
and fair elections, independent media, investment, rebuilding of infrastructure, and 
preparing people for post-conflict life.  
The relative significance of the military and non-military measures of crisis 
management depends on the nature of the situation.19 Blomberg argues that if the 
crisis becomes violent and the origin of the conflict is of an ethnic kind, military 
methods may be needed.20 But civilian crisis management capabilities are essential in 
the post-conflict phase to establish stability, which is supported by political, social, 
and economic progress.   
Nordic states of the EU, especially Sweden and Finland, have wanted to 
strengthen the EU’s crisis management capability, but they resisted the idea of a 
territorial defense within the EU believing that it may harm their non-aligned status 
and alienate Russia and cause tensions in the EU-Russian relationship.21 Besides, 
these two states emphasized the need to foster civilian crisis management along with 
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military crisis management.22 Based on a Finnish-Swedish initiative, at the Helsinki 
Summit of 1999, it was decided that:  
A non-military crisis management mechanism will be established 
to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means 
and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of 
the Union and the Member States… The European Council asks 
the incoming Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High 
Representative, to carry work forward in the General Affairs 
Council on all aspects of the reports as a matter of priority, 
including conflict prevention and a committee for civilian crisis 
management.23 
Besides, the European Council decided to prepare an Action Plan to determine the 
steps the Union has to undertake to develop a rapid reaction capability in the field of 
crisis management by using non-military instruments. According to this plan, the 
Union should aim at: 
Strengthening the synergy and responsiveness of national, 
collective and NGO resources in order to avoid duplication and 
improve performance, while maintaining the flexibility of each 
contributor to decide on the deployment of assets and capabilities 
in a particular crisis, or via a particular channel; enhancing and 
facilitating the EU’s contributions to, and activities within, other 
organisations, such as the UN and the OSCE whenever one of them 
is the lead organisation in a particular crisis, as well as EU 
autonomous actions; ensuring inter-pillar coherence. 24 
To achieve this plan the European Council put forward some requirements to be 
fulfilled by the member states and the Union itself:25 
- Member states and the Union should develop a rapid reaction capability 
by defining material, personnel and financial resources that could be used in response 
to a request of the agencies like the UN and the OSCE and in autonomous EU 
actions, 
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- A database should be established to provide and share information on the 
pre-identified assets, capabilities and expertise within all areas relevant to non-
military crisis management, 
- A study should be implemented to define concrete targets for EU Member 
States’ collective non-military response to international crises (e.g. the ability to 
deploy a combined search and rescue capability of up to 200 people within twenty-
four hours). 
Besides, the European Council of Helsinki required the establishment of a 
Rapid Reaction Fund to allow the acceleration of the provision of finance to support 
EU activities, to contribute to operations run by other international organisations and 
to fund NGO activities.26 After the Helsinki Summit, in Lisbon 2000, the Committee 
for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management was established, along with a database of 
EU civilian police capabilities, and a crisis cell.27 
The European Council of Santa Maria Da Feira of 19 and 20 June 2000 took 
important decisions for the development of civilian crisis management capabilities. 
In the Feira Summit of 2000, the EU member states have decided to provide up to 
5,000 police officers for international missions of conflict prevention and crisis 
management operations by 2003.28 Member States have also decided to identify and 
deploy up to 1,000 police officers within 30 days.29   
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4.2 Presidency Conclusions of the European Council of Santa Maria Da 
Feira  
By the help of non-military crisis management capability, the EU aims to 
prevent the escalation of conflicts, consolidate peace and internal stability in periods 
of transition. In addition, it is emphasized that the complementarity between the 
military and civilian aspects of crisis management covering the full range of 
Petersberg tasks should be ensured.30 As a result of the seminar in Lisbon on 3-4 
April 2000, The European Council of Santa Maria Da Feira identified priorities, 
which the EU will focus on. The European Council determined concrete targets in 
the four civilian areas for crisis management: police, rule of law, civilian 
administration, and civil protection.  
Police. In relation to the police, member states committed themselves to the 
formation of 5,000 policemen for civilian crisis management operations. The current 
total deployment of EU member states is approximately 3.300 persons.31 The police 
force will be used to implement operations and missions of police advice, training, 
monitoring as well as executive policing.32 In other words, the police force will 
prevent or mitigate internal crises and conflicts (such as MINUGUA in Guatemala), 
restore law and order in non-stabilized situations, (such as UNMIK/KFOR in Kosovo 
and UNTAET in East Timor), and ensure respect for basic human rights standards in 
support of the local police (such as WEU/MAPE in Albania, WEUPOL in Mostar 
and ONUSAL in El Salvador).33  
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Strengthening Rule of Law. The European Council of Santa Maria Da Feira 
decided that the following measures should be considered:34 firstly, member states 
should establish national arrangements for selection of the staff such as judges and 
prosecutors, deploy these staff as soon as possible to peace support operations, and 
consider ways to train them appropriately. Secondly, the EU should consider ways of 
supporting the establishment or restoration of infrastructures of local courts and 
prisons as well as recruitment of local court personnel and prison officers in the 
context of peace support operations. 
In this area, it is emphasized that the EU lacks readily available personnel in 
the member states that would be deployed to the crisis areas.35 For this reason, the 
Commission launched a project for the establishment of a network of training 
institutions in the member states for the development of training modules for 
personnel that would be deployed in peacekeeping missions.36     
Civilian Administration. The European Council decided that the member 
states could consider improving the selection, training and deployment of civil 
administration experts for the tasks in the re-establishment of collapsed 
administrative systems in the crisis areas.37 Besides, the Commission initiated a 
project with the member states on the role of customs services in crisis areas for the 
re-establishment of local administrations.38 
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Civil Protection. In this area, it is aimed that the Union will serve in the 
coordination of national civil protection bodies, early warning and information 
exchange, co-operation for the training of civil protection personnel and the 
establishment of databases.39   
On 11 April 2001, the European Commission adopted a communication on 
the financing of civilian crisis management operations.40 It is emphasized that the 
Communication aims to inform the discussion on crisis financing and suggest an 
alternative to the creation of ad-hoc member state funds outside the regular EC 
budget.41 Besides, on 11 April 2001, the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) was 
created to make better use of existing EU capabilities for civil crisis management.42 
The RRM will allow the EU to activate the Community funds very quickly in 
response to crises or emerging crises.43 It is stated that the Commission will 
undertake RRM in close coordination with the Council’s Policy Planning and Early 
Warning Unit, the Situation Center and other crisis management divisions to provide 
complementarity of EU external action.44        
In practice, the EU has been increasingly involved in crisis management as a 
civilian power through the European Community Monitor Mission (ECCM) in 
Yugoslavia (1991), export control regime for dual-use goods (1994), anti-personnel 
landmines actions (1995), code of conduct on arms exports (1998). Besides, the EU 
created the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) in 1992 to provide 
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emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict 
outside the EU.45 This was followed by the 1999 Stability Pact for Southeast Europe 
to deal with the tasks of stabilization and reconstruction in the war-torn former 
Yugoslavia. The Stability Pact is a key project, which emphasizes the civilian power 
approach of the EU. The aim of the Pact is to foster peace, democracy, respect for 
human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole 
region.     
4.3 Stability Pact 
Kosovo conflict indicated that Europe could not afford another devastating 
conflict in the Balkans as in Bosnia and Kosovo. Since there are enormous problems 
in the Balkans, another conflict might have spread to Macedonia, Albania, and 
Montenegro, and escalated even further.46 For this reason, the international 
community pushed for an integrative and long-term policy, which perceives the 
region as a whole.47 Thus, the Kosovo conflict emphasized the tensions in the Balkan 
region and indicated the need for urgent efforts to eliminate political, economic, and 
social problems.48 
In June 1999, with the EU’s initiative, the Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe was adopted in Cologne. In the founding document, more than 40 partner 
countries and organizations decided to strengthen the countries of South Eastern 
Europe ‘in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and 
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 97 
economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region’.49 It is 
emphasized that the Stability Pact is the first serious attempt by the international 
community to replace reactive crisis management policy in South East Europe (SEE) 
with a comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention policy.50 It is argued that 
conflict prevention and peace building can be successful only if they start in parallel 
in three sectors: the creation of a secure environment, the promotion of economic 
and social well-being, the promotion of sustainable democratic values.51 For this 
reason, the Stability Pact aimed to have development in all three sectors to provide a 
self-sustaining process of peace. The key aim of the Stability Pact is to contribute to 
the stability in the region. Stability is seen as the key requirement for development 
and prosperity, which are the ultimate goals of the whole process. The Pact also 
aimed to secure peace and democracy, open market economy, multicultural and civil 
societies.52  
4.3.1 Organizational Structure 
The official participants of the Pact are Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Macedonia, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the 
UK, the USA. There are also a number of countries taking part in the Pact as 
observers: the Czech Republic, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Switzerland 
and Ukraine. Besides, there are participating international organizations: the Council 
of Europe, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the 
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51 Ibid. 
 98 
European Investment Bank (EIB), NATO, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank. 
Most of the activities of the Stability Pact take place in its three Working 
Tables: Working Table I deals with seven specific areas which are Human Rights and 
National Minorities (lead sponsor Slovenia, in close cooperation with Council of 
Europe), Good Governance (Council of Europe), Refugee Return (UNHCR), Gender 
(OSCE), Media (UK), Education and Youth (Austria) and Parliamentary Exchanges 
(Royaumont Process). Working Table I focuses on the following areas:53     
- Human Rights and Minorities: The objective of this sub-table is to 
support and strengthen minority rights and to provide mutual respect between the 
different communities.  
- Good Governance: This sub-table deals with the development of local 
governments, the appointment ombudsmen and women and the reform of public 
administration.  
- Media: The general objective is to develop fully free and independent 
media in the region, accountable to the public and separated from political party 
influence.  
- Education and Youth: This task force deals with university education and 
vocational training, the teaching of history, and youth issues. 
- Gender Issues: Countries of the region have an extremely low percentage 
of women participating in national parliaments and local politics. The main objective 
is the promotion of greater women’s political participation. This sub-table is devoted 
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to achieving equality and the appropriate representation of women in public life and 
in the political process. 
- Parliamentary Cooperation: The objective is to promote democracy by 
supporting the role of parliaments and their contribution to stability in the region. 
This task force promotes education, exchange, cooperation between members of 
parliament and their staff.  
- Return of Refugees: This sub-table works on a package of legal, economic 
and social measures in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina, which aims to assist the 
return of refugees and exiles to their home regions. 
Working Table II: It aims to promote greater prosperity throughout the 
region and to assist the integration of the SEE countries into both the European and 
the global economy. The Table is also involved in many other fields including 
infrastructure building, private sector development, trade, investment, vocational 
education and training, and environmental issues.54 
The European Investment Bank prepared a programme for improvement of 
regional infrastructure. The focus of this plan was on transport, energy, water and 
telecommunication sectors. 35 projects were chosen to be included in the Quick Start 
Package (QSP). In the regional donor conference, 1221 million euros were collected 
for the funding of these 35 QSP projects.55  
Working Table III: This table aims to promote security and confidence in 
SEE by providing transparency and predictability in the internal security sectors 
throughout the Balkans.56 Stability Pact partners cooperate on issues such as 
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exchange of military information, notification and observation of military activities, 
restrictions on the location of heavy weapons. Besides, the Pact seeks to develop an 
integrated humanitarian demining action in various countries in the region. The sub-
table on humanitarian demining acts as a forum for coordination and information 
sharing in the area of mine action between the mine-affected countries of the 
region.57 
4.3.2 The Regional Funding Conference and Quick Start Package 
The first Regional Funding Conference took place on 29 and 30 March 2000 
in Brussels. The Special Coordinator of the Pact presented a Quick Start Package to 
the donor community. The package consisted of some 200 projects, from all three 
working tables, with a value of 1.8 billion Euros. The implementation of the projects 
was to start within 12 months. The financial requirements included 1.8 million euro 
for working table initiatives: 255 million euro for WT I (including refugee return), 
1.499 million euro for WT II, 78 million euro for WT III. 58 It is believed as a 
success that international donors promised a total amount of 2.4 billion euro for the 
proposed quick start regional projects and programs. Most of the contributions were 
provided by the European Commission (530 million euro) and the various 
international financial institutions (894 million euro). In addition, the EU member-
states jointly pledged an additional 552 million euro, while the US contributed 80 
million euro for QSP. 59  
4.3.3 Achievements of the Stability Pact 
The most important development of the Pact was the donor conference held 
on 29-30 March 2000 in Brussels. In this conference, the international community 
committed approximately $6 billion assistance to the countries of SEE for 2000. 
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Over 85% of this assistance is being provided by European countries and institutions, 
and international financial institutions. Of this $6 billion, the international 
community pledged $2.4 billion for 200 Quick Start Projects, which cover everything 
from development to security and democratization. The sum was 600 million euros 
higher than expected and this is seen as an expression of Europe’s political and 
financial commitment to the reconstruction effort.60 
Infrastructure Development. In the March Regional Funding Conference of 
2000, it was approved a Quick Start Package which includes infrastructure projects 
designed to support the development of a Southeast European electricity market 
linked to main European networks, to develop water resources in the Danube Basin 
and the Adriatic, and to fix transport bottlenecks and link the countries of the region 
to major European transport corridors.61 
Regional Trade Barriers. Macedonia has led an initiative to reduce trade 
barriers within the region. Macedonia, working with the European Commission, is 
chairing a working group of regional states which develops a cooperative action plan 
to reduce barriers to trade within SEE and between the region and other European 
and global trading partners.62 As a first step, the countries in the region are collecting 
data on existing trade regimes and identifying priority areas.     
Developing an Active Civil Society. In February 2000, Stability Pact nations 
agreed to increase the involvement of NGOs in the development and implementation 
of program strategies. For this reason, NGOs increasingly participate in working 
groups and specialized meetings.  
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The Special Coordinator of the Pact initiated a project between NATO and 
the World Bank to provide a labour redeployment for excess military officers in 
Bulgaria and Romania.63 For this reason, Romania released 11.000 officers over the 
last three years and plans to release 20.000 officers in the period 2000-2007, and 
Bulgaria plans to release 20.000 officers in the period 2000-2004.64 It is emphasized 
that this project is a good example of the synergy created by the Pact between 
specialized agencies, international financial organizations and the regions’ 
countries.65     
Reducing the Threat of Small Arms. All regional countries decided to 
destroy illegal and surplus small arms and light weapons, and guarantee safe storage 
of legitimate stockpiles. Norway and the US have formed observation teams to 
determine what each country needs to fulfill these commitments. A team has already 
visited Albania and others will soon visit Bulgaria and Macedonia.66 
A regional conference on export controls was held in Bulgaria on 14-15 
December 1999. The participants declared their willingness to share information on 
transfers of arms and refrain from irresponsible arms sales.67 The countries of SEE 
also agreed to make parallel their arms export policies to major European and 
international standards and to develop a common end-user certificate.68 Besides, 
Slovenia hosted a Workshop on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Ljubljana on 27 
January 2000. After these conferences, important developments occurred in this area: 
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firstly, this project has received 1.1 million euros in pledges; secondly, in Albania, 
40.000 light weapons have been collected and destroyed.69           
Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Military Contacts. Stability Pact 
countries adopted an agreement to implement their commitments under international 
WMD conventions and called on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to comply with 
the Chemical Weapons Convention.70 
Another project in this area is the establishment of Regional Arms Control 
Verification and Implementation Assistance Center (RACVIAC). A Coordination 
Conference was held in Berlin on 7 July 2000. After this conference, the RADVIAC 
center was opened in Zagreb, Croatia on 2 October 2000.71     
Combating Corruption. The SEE countries, under an Anti-Corruption 
Initiative, have decided to make domestic government procedures more transparent, 
take specific measures to promote public service integrity, and establish a review 
body to monitor integrity in the administration of foreign aid programs and national 
anti-corruption efforts. Countries committed to ratify and implement existing 
international anti-corruption instruments, such as the Council of Europe Criminal 
Law Convention. Besides, it is emphasized that each country will work with an 
implementation/monitoring team including representatives from the US, the Council 
of Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the World 
Bank and the Special Coordinator of the Pact.72  
Fighting Cross-Border Crime. It was decided a center would be operational 
in Bucharest under the name of the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative 
(SECI) to serve as a central regional clearinghouse on cross-border crime issues. In 
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addition, the countries in the region are also establishing joint task forces on three 
critical issues: trafficking in human beings, customs fraud and smuggling, and 
narcotics trafficking.73  
Humanitarian Demining. The Stability Pact aimed to develop an integrated 
demining strategy in the region. For this reason, the key actors (the United Nations 
Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the EU, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, 
Russia, Slovenia, NATO, the Office of High Representative in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (OHR), the World Bank, and the International Trust Fund) set up a 
Regional Mine Action Support Group (RMASG) at a meeting in Sarajevo on 11-12 
May 2000. RMASG is carrying out three specific projects for mine-action assistance 
in Croatia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina with the goal of removing all of the 
recorded minefields in this area.74     
New Relations with the EU. The beginning of the EU’s accession talks with 
Bulgaria and Romania (December 1999) and EU stabilization and association 
agreements with Albania and Macedonia (November 1999) provided a new impetus 
to the bilateral EU-Balkan state relations. 
True democratic changes have happened in the FRY and Croatia. The 
spectacular political change in Croatia resulting from the important victory of 
democratic and anti-nationalistic parties in the parliamentary and presidential 
elections in January 2000 has been interpreted as a wave of democratization in the 
territory of former Yugoslavia.75 This democratic change brought Croatia closer to 
the EU and NATO.76 
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4.3.4 Problems and Failures of the Stability Pact 
The Stability Pact has faced serious risks and hurdles. The first few months 
were promising, since the shock of the war in Kosovo seemed to unite the major 
international actors. However, the end of German EU Presidency has slowed down 
the momentum of the whole process significantly. Because, other governments have 
appeared to give less priority to this project during their own presidency.77  
The financial commitment of the international community. It is emphasized 
that budget deficits in West European states would delay spending of considerable 
amounts of money to the Stability Pact projects. For instance, German government 
decided to cut its budget by 7.4 percent in the year 2000 in order to consolidate the 
federal budget, which aroused a storm of protest.78 For this reason, it seems difficult 
for the states to grant great amounts of money to a project that will provide results in 
the long run.  
Rise of organized crime and corruption. The corruption and organized crime 
is high in SEE countries. The most serious threat to the stability of the region comes 
from the Albanian mafia. It is reported that the Albanian mafia is supplying up to 
%40 of the heroin sold in Europe and North America.79 Besides, smuggling is also 
one of the crimes committed by the Albanian mafia.80 It is also argued that under-age 
girls were smuggled by the Albanian mafia and sold in Western Europe like slaves 
and forced into prostitution.81         
Continuing decline in living standards and rising inequality. Three years 
after the programme started, Bosnia is still dependent on international aid. The 
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15.000 employees in Sarajevo is the main source of growth. There is no foreign 
investment and unemployment is about %40.82 Besides, Bosnia and Herzegovina still 
cannot operate without the presence of international stabilization forces.83  
Frustration of Public Expectations. The Pact created exaggerated 
expectations. However, the public opinion polls carried out in different countries 
indicate that the positive expectations are fading.84 There are democratic, reformist 
governments in Bulgaria, the FYROM, Romania, Albania, Croatia, and in the FRY. 
But public support for democratic institutions is declining. Because much have been 
promised, but little delivered so far. For instance, after the Donor Conference of 
2000, under Working Table II, only %6 percent of the expected funds had been 
contracted by September 2000.85  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
At the Helsinki Summit of 1999, it was decided that the EU would have a 
Rapid Reaction Force to conduct Petersberg missions by 2003. It may be thought by 
some that the decision to have a military force would bring the end of civilian power 
EU. Though, the EU does not intend to establish its own army. The EU is still a 
civilian power. The decisions of the European Council of Santa Maria Da Feira of 
2000 also emphasize civilian power approach of the EU.  
The European Council of Santa Maria Da Feira approved the development 
of civilian crisis management capabilities in the EU. At the Summit, the EU member 
states determined concrete targets in the four civilian areas for crisis management: 
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police, rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection. Member states also 
decided to provide up to 5,000 police officers for international missions for conflict 
prevention and crisis management operations by 2003.  
The Stability Pact for SEE and the enlargement project are the international 
actions that have civilian character implemented by the EU. The Stability Pact aimed 
to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic poverty in order 
to achieve stability in the whole Balkans. The most important development of the 
Pact was the donor conference held on 29-30 March 2000 in Brussels. In this 
conference, the international community pledged approximately $6 billion assistance 
to the countries of Southeast Europe. European countries and institutions committed 
to provide over %85 of this assistance. In the conference, the Special Coordinator of 
the Pact presented a Quick Start Package (QSP), which covers projects related with 
regional development, security, and democratization, to the donor community. Of 
this $6 billion, the international community pledged $2,4 billion for 200 QSP 
projects.         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 108 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation analyzes the evolution of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy of the European Union with particular emphasis on post-Cold War 
developments. In this study, it is aimed to analyze the implications of the divisions 
within the EU, which result from the internal dynamics of the Union, to the EU’s 
evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy. It is argued that the divisions within 
the EU have so far prevented the Union from pursuing an effective Common Foreign 
and Security Policy.     
During the Cold War, EC member states were unable to cooperate in the 
field of security and defense. The security institutions of Europe, in particular the 
EDC and WEU failed to provide military cooperation in Western Europe. The main 
reason behind these failures was the divergences of security policies between the 
leading states of Europe, in particular among France, West Germany, and Britain. 
Hence, the security of Western Europe was guaranteed by NATO during the Cold 
War. In other words, the divisions in Western Europe some of which remain to date, 
have prevented Western Europeans from establishing an autonomous security 
system. 
In post-Cold War era, the divisions within the EU have shaped the 
development of the European security architecture. There are several divisions within 
the EU about crisis management. Firstly, the Nordic states of the EU, especially 
Finland and Sweden, supports the development of a EU crisis management capacity. 
Besides, they insist on putting civilian crisis management on an equal footing with 
military crisis management. Both countries emphasize that the UN should mandate 
the EU peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, the EU is developing 
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autonomous capacities as an international actor. For this reason, the EU should be 
able to act without being bound to any agreement of the UN, since any EU action 
may be blocked in the event of a veto by a permanent member of the Security 
Council.1 Secondly, the EU member states cannot reach an agreement about the 
capabilities, which the Rapid Reaction Force would have. Whilst most EU member 
states think that the EU should acquire some military capability to focus on small-
scale Petersberg missions such as peacekeeping and rescue missions,2 Britain and 
France think that the EU military force should have the capability to carry out the full 
range of Petersberg tasks.3 Thirdly, there is a discussion about the methodology for 
the creation of RRF. Whilst France and Britain promotes the ‘bottom up’ approach 
that relies on the voluntary national contributions, Germany promotes the ‘top-down’ 
approach that requires the acting of Council of Defense Ministers on advice from the 
EU military committee. Fourth, whilst France thinks that the creation of an effective 
ESDP would create a more balanced Atlantic Alliance, Britain worries that in case 
Europe demonstrated a serious capacity to manage its own security affairs, the US 
would move back to isolationism and NATO would collapse.4  
Fifth, Germany appears unwilling to commit to further military involvement 
in multilateral task forces, whilst paying attention to its responsibilities as a NATO 
and EU member. Germany tries to influence EU security policy in the direction of 
non-military endeavors in which political cooperation is more important than 
military intervention. It could be argued that this is why Germany has assumed an 
active role in the implementation of the Stability Pact, which aims to provide 
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regional security, development in democracy, human rights, and economy to South 
Eastern Europe. In other words, the implementation of the Stability Pact emphasizes 
the civilian power approach of Germany.      
Finally, Western European states cannot agree on what kind of role the 
European Union should play as a unitary actor on the world arena. Van Ham argues 
that the Maastricht Treaty does not specify whether the EU should eventually evolve 
into a full superpower, a regional power, a civil power.5 Many European states are 
preoccupied with internal economic and political issues. This is likely to result in 
differing perceptions of threat and interpretations over the implementation of a 
CFSP. 
In the post-Cold War era, two proposals were put forward for the 
development of a military crisis management capability that would be used by the 
EU in the conduct of Petersberg tasks: ESDI in NATO, and ESDP in the EU. In this 
study, the development of ESDI and ESDP is analyzed. During this analysis, I sought 
to answer the question that whether ESDI and ESDP would be successful in their 
efforts to provide a military crisis management capability for the European Union.            
NATO members agreed to construct ESDI inside their organization in 
Brussels in 1994. NATO began to develop CJTF force model to allow the WEU to 
conduct Petersberg type operations with NATO assets.  At the Amsterdam Summit 
of 1997, the EU decided to take over both the responsibility for and the management 
of Petersberg missions from the WEU. NATO responded to this development by 
declaring at the North Atlantic Council meetings in 1999 that it would provide the 
EU ready access to NATO assets and capabilities for EU-only operations.   
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However, there are several problematic issues about the development of the 
European Security and Defense Identity in NATO. First, France and the US do not 
agree on a mechanism for political control over a CJTF. Since France withdrew from 
the integrated command of NATO in 1966, it would be excluded from some of the 
most important decisions. For this reason, France wants to establish a separate body 
to authorize and conduct CJTF operations. Second, France is not satisfied with the 
‘separable but not separate’ concept that requires the participation of American 
officials in every decision making process that involves the use of alliance assets, 
even if they will not participate in a CJTF operation. Third, at the North Atlantic 
Council meetings of 1999, it was decided that the EU would have the right of ready 
access to NATO collective assets and capabilities to conduct independent military 
operations, but on a case-by-case basis and by consensus. On the other hand, the US 
will retain an effective veto over CJTF operations, since it will insist on giving its 
approval before giving its assets. Thus, the success of the CJTF structure will depend 
on the US authorization to give its assets and capabilities to the European command. 
Fourth, there may be a possible resistance within the NATO military bureaucracy for 
EU-led CJTF operations. This is because, NATO military staff will be asked to 
implement a CJTF outside their region, besides, another regional command could be 
given control over an operation within their territory. Moreover, double-hatted staff 
officials will contribute a significant part of their time to CJTF planning by reducing 
their time, which is devoted to their regular command responsibilities.  
At the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the EU announced a common European 
Security and Defense Policy that includes a headline goal, which requires the 
creation of a rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops with all military requirements to 
conduct sustainable crisis operations in the European area by 2003. On the other 
 112 
hand, there are various challenges ahead for the evolution of the ESDP. First, there is 
a lack of concrete agreement among EU member states on threats, strategic vision 
and operational contingencies. Second, it is not clear whether the goal of 50,000-
60,000 troops would be sufficient for Petersberg type missions. Third, the 
nationalistic rivalries and disputes in European defense industry prevent the 
Europeans to develop the strategic requirements needed for the development of an 
autonomous military crisis management capability.      
  Another challenge ahead of the ESDP is the reluctance among European 
states to increase their defense spending to create an effective military crisis 
management force. The reduced defense spending in Europe depends on three 
factors: economic growth, threat perception, and the significance of social priorities 
other than national defense. Besides, endeavors like the economic reconstruction of 
the Balkans economically provides new burdens on European budgets, and limits the 
funds available for military spending. As a result, most EU member states lack the 
means to conduct truly demanding and modern military operations: airlift, sealift, 
satellite intelligence, precision guided munitions, and all weather and night strike 
capabilities. Hence, it seems unreasonable for the EU to narrow down the capabilities 
gap with the reduced defense budgets.   
As a result, the EU, as a military actor, does not have the required military 
capabilities. As it was observed in the Kosovo crisis, most European forces lack the 
means to conduct truly demanding and modern military operations: airlift, sealift, 
satellite intelligence, precision guided munitions, and all weather and night strike 
capabilities. Besides, Gordon argues that European members of NATO, which have 
nearly 2 million men and women in uniform, had great difficulty providing 40,000 
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troops for Kosovo.6 On the other hand, it seems unreasonable for the EU to narrow 
down the capabilities gap due to the problems explained above. For this reason, 
several guiding principles should be kept in mind for an effective European military 
crisis management capability.  
Firstly, there should be a compromise between the EU and NATO. Both the 
US and France would have to give up some of their dominance in their preferred 
organizations for a mutual compromise to be reached. The European Union, with its 
planned multinational rapid reaction force of 60.000, can focus on small-scale 
operations such as rescue missions and peacekeeping, and apply for NATO to use its 
assets and capabilities for large scale operations such as peace enforcement missions. 
But, NATO assets must be made available for use by the EU. In brief, the US should 
provide relief to the Europeans that worry about a possible veto for the EU-led 
NATO operations. Gordon argues that it is unlikely that the US would both decline 
to participate in a mission and use its veto to prevent Europeans from conducting that 
mission.7  
Second, there should not be an institutional rivalry between NATO and EU. 
Anything that limits NATO as a result of ESDP decision-making process or anything 
that limits the ESDP as a result of the NATO decision-making process would prevent 
substantive cooperation. These problems could be overcome with a single combined 
decision-making council.8  
Thirdly, European governments are aware that American administrations are 
increasingly unwilling to send ground troops for peacekeeping operations. So, 
European forces will need a high level of readiness. Although the RRF aims to 
mobilize 60,000 troops, with rotation, the number increases to 180,000 troops. The 
                                                 
6 Gordon, Their Own Army? Making European Defense Work. 
7 Ibid. 
 114 
EU member states currently have about 1,7 million forces, 500,000 of which are 
conscripts.9 A 100,000 of EU forces now serve in the Balkans, with rotation 
requiring 300,000 troops.10 In other words, the troops required for RRF duty could 
amount to 20% of the EU’s total forces available. The main problem is that few of 
them are trained and equipped to the standards for the large-scale Petersberg 
missions.11  
Hence, the Europeans should commit themselves to modernizing their 
military capabilities in proportion to their defense budgets. There are also few but 
positive developments:12 For instance, France, Germany, and the UK decided to 
construct a Multi-Role Armored Vehicle (MRAV). Thomson-CSF of France and 
GDC Marconi of the UK aimed to be the second supplier of underwater listening 
devices after Lockheed Martin of the US. Besides, France and Germany are 
constructing an attack helicopter, Tiger.  
In 1999, critical European consolidations in defense industry took place. 
British Aerospace and GEC-Marconi in the UK merged by creating BAE Systems. 
The negotiations between Aerospatiale-Matra of France, Dasa of Germany, and 
CASA of Spain led to the formation of the European Aeronautic, Defense and Space 
Company (EADS). These consolidations in European defense industry have created 
industrial base for competition with the big American industrial companies.13 
Cooperation in European defense industry has a positive effect on its global 
economic performance. This is important not only for the prospects of strengthening 
                                                                                                                                          
8 Moens, European Defense and NATO, 275. 
9 Howorth, Prospects for ESDP after September 11. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Carl C. Hodge, Redefining European Security, 329. 
13 Alexander Moens and Rafal Domisiewicz, “European and North American Trends in Defense 
Industry: Problems and Prospects of a Cross-Atlantic Defense Market” (International 
Security Research and Outreach Programme, April 2001), 13. Available from 
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/ Moens.pdf; accessed 11 July 2002. 
 115 
Europe's defense capabilities, but also for the strength of the European economy. The 
European aerospace industry ranks as the 13th largest in Europe in terms of 
employment, supporting directly 422,484 jobs and indirectly generating jobs for 1.2 
million people employed in more than 700 firms.14  
Whilst the defense industry and procurement side of Europe have changed a 
great deal, the demand side of the equation has not changed anywhere as radically.15 
In other words, lower military budgets in European states may prevent the European 
defense firms to sell their defense products. At the same time, the US is under a great 
deal of pressure to open up its defense market. The United States cannot expect to 
sell the Europeans their final products in order to maintain interoperability, due to the 
industry consolidation in Europe.16 Hence, the US defense firms need to develop 
joint technology and platforms with European firms. 
Finally, the EU must involve non-European allies as closely as possible in 
their new initiative. The EU should create structures that would allow non-EU 
members to be involved in decision-making process and should not ignore their 
effective military capabilities. Turkey as a non-EU NATO member state wants to 
participate in the planning and in the operational phases of the military operations 
conducted by the European Union. ESDP mechanisms accept the right of non-EU 
allies to contribute operationally to the EU missions, but not to participate in the 
decision to conduct. Turkey insists on full and equal participation in the process 
leading to decision-making on all EU operations drawing on the collective assets and 
capabilities of NATO and their implementation. Besides, Turkey wants to participate 
on a regular basis in day-to-day planning and consultations on matters related to 
                                                                                                                                          
 
14 Ibid. , 16. 
15 Ibid. , 17. 
16 Ibid. , 26. 
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European security. Turkish officials argue that the EU might launch operations 
directly affecting Turkish national interests without Turkish involvement.17 They are 
also worried that an EU force could be deployed in Cyprus against Turkey’s wishes, 
and that some future Aegean crisis might line up Ankara against the EU as a whole.18 
For this reason, Turkey insists that a security decision of the EU that would be 
implemented using NATO assets should be subject to the North Atlantic Council’s 
approval, thus requiring the votes of NATO members.19 Besides, the US supports the 
Turkish position and argues that the ESDI should not discriminate against non-EU 
members or duplicate NATO defense structures.20    
Turkey’s inclusion into the EU orbit brings numerous benefits to the EU’s 
foreign and security policies. Turkey is at the crossroads of issues that have 
importance on the European continent, including NATO, the Balkans, Cyprus, the 
Aegean, Iraq sanctions, Russian relations in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and 
transit routes for Caspian oil and gas.21 Turkey plays the role of an energy corridor 
for Europe. This role will increase when the energy resources of the Caspian region 
reach the world markets. Turkey has the sixth largest army in the world. Turkey with 
its large, effective, and modern army has much to contribute to the developing 
European security architecture. On the other hand, Turkish army has experience in 
low-intensity warfare, which is particularly important for Petersberg missions.22 
Besides, Turkey had signed a contract with the Bell Helicopter Textron of the US to 
                                                 
17 Bill Park, “Turkey Delays EU Defense Plans,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (August 2001): 19.   
18 Ibid. 
19 Meltem Müftüler-Bac, “Turkey’s Role in the EU’s Security and Foreign Policies,” Security 
Dialogue 31, no. 4 (2000): 494. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. , 495.  
22 Pınar Bilgin, “Turkey & The EU: Yesterday’s Answers to Tomorrow’s Security Problems?” in EU 
Civilian Crisis Management, Graeme P. Herd and Jouko Huru, eds. (Surrey: Conflict Studies 
Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2001): 46. In Ali Karaosmanoğlu, 
“Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği Açısından Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri,” 
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construct about a hundred attack helicopters, AH-1Z, which is the most capable 
attack helicopter after the US Apache and Comanche attack helicopters. Therefore, 
the EU should not ignore the capabilities of air power of Turkish army and its 
positive contribution for a possible EU-only military operation.    
As it is stated in the introduction, understanding the internal dynamics of the 
EU has vital importance for Turkey. This is because Turkish policy makers are far 
from understanding these dynamics that shape the security policies of the Union. For 
instance, Turkey makes its plans and preparations as if the EU will create a military 
force for crisis management purposes. For this reason, Turkey offered in February 
2000 to provide a brigade-size unit supported by air and naval components. Yet, 
Turkey does not have any contribution plan for the development of non-military 
crisis management in the EU. In addition, the development of non-military measures 
within the EU and Turkey’s possible contribution to EU’s non-military crisis 
management is not widely discussed among the academic circumstances in Turkey. 
Orhun, one of the few Turkish officials who discuss this subject, states that not only 
military but also non-military crisis management operations are of particular 
significance to Turkey.23 But he does not provide any proposals for the active 
participation of Turkey to the non-military crisis management of the Union. After all, 
Turkey has an underdeveloped economy and has struggled with high inflation for 
twenty years. For this reason, Turkey may face problems whilst financing non-
military crisis management projects of the EU, which require the financial support of 
the participant states.  
                                                                                                                                          
Turkey-EU Relations from the Perspective of ESDI) Doğu Batı no. 14, (February, March, 
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23 Ömür Orhun, “European Security and Defense Identity - Common European Security and Defense 
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Whilst the European Council set the headline goal in terms of military 
capabilities at Helsinki Summit of 1999, it was also decided to establish a non-
military crisis management mechanism to coordinate and make more effective the 
civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones. Later, the European 
Council of Santa Maria Da Feira identified priorities, which the EU will focus on. It 
determined concrete targets in the four civilian areas for crisis management: police, 
rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection.  
In 1999, the EU launched the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, which is a 
key project that emphasizes the civilian power approach of the EU. The aim of the 
Pact was to provide peace and democracy, and economic prosperity in order to 
achieve stability in the whole region. A Quick Start Package, which consists of some 
200 projects that have priority for the development of the region, was prepared. A 
donor conference was held on 29-30 March 2000 in Brussels for the financing of the 
Stability Pact projects. In this conference, the international community committed 
approximately $6 billion assistance to the countries of SEE for 2000.  
Whilst the developments in the first year of the Pact was remarkable, today 
the Stability Pact faces serious risks and hurdles: Biermann argues that after the 
German Presidency, the Pact lost its priority and other presidencies appear to give 
less priority to the Pact projects.24 Second, the unemployment rate continuously 
increases in the Balkans (%11 in Romania and Bulgaria, %20 in Croatia and Albania, 
%40 Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina).25 Moreover, three years after the 
programme started, Bosnia is still dependent on international aid. Third, the 
continuity of conflict, insecurity, and extreme poverty feeds corruption and 
                                                 
24 Biermann, The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 36. 
25 Gligorov, Stability Pact for South-East Europe. 
 119 
organized crime in the region.26 Fourth, budget deficits in West European states 
would delay spending of considerable amounts of money to the Stability Pact 
projects. Fifth, the public opinion polls carried out in different countries of the region 
indicate that the positive expectations created by the Pact are fading.27 Public support 
for the democratic institutions, which serves in Bulgaria, the FYROM, Romania, 
Albania, Croatia, and in the FRY, is declining. For this reason, the financing of the 
Quick Start Package projects has vital importance for the stability of the region as 
well as the success of the EU in non-military crisis management.  
In conclusion, the divisions within the European Union have prevented the 
Union to pursue an effective Common Foreign and Security Policy. Although, the 
Union decided to establish a Rapid Reaction Force for military crisis management, it 
is possible that this force will not be sufficient in number and technical capabilities 
for the full range of Petersberg missions. Hence, for an effective military crisis 
management capability, the EU should cooperate with NATO. At the same time, few 
EU member states give importance to the development of a non-military crisis 
management in the EU.  The Stability Pact that launched in 1999 faces serious 
problems. Hence, the EU should develop a crisis management capability to cover 
both military and civilian aspects in a balanced way.28 The civilian and military crisis 
management capabilities should be complementary and be developed in parallel and 
close cooperation. 
                                                 
26 Nenad Pandurovic, “Security Aspects of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe,” Security 
Dialogue 32, no. 3 (2001): 322Pandurovic, Security Aspects of the Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe, 322. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Tuomioja, Non-Military Crisis Management as a Part of Foreign & Security Policy, 7. 
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